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ULE 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required in
the interest of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the
court may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a
new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may
be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but
if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on
remand of'the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other
grounds shall be made within five days after verdict or finding of
guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the
five-day period."
I.
HISTORY OF DRA FTING OF

RULE

33.

When the drafting of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was commenced, there were in effect title 28, section 391, authorizing
federal courts to grant new trials in both civil and criminal cases, and
rule II of the Criminal Appeals Rules of the United States Supreme
Court providing for new trials in criminal cases. Also in operation
was rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for new
trials in civil cases.
In the first draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dated
September 8, 1941, rule 59 was modeled largely on the corresponding
civil rule of procedure. Subdivision (a) provided that existing grounds
for new trial be continued. A new trial might be granted to all or any
of the defendants as to all or part of the issues. Subdivision (b) provided that the motion be made not later than three days after the entry
t Professor of Law, Indiana University; Member United States Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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of judgment, except that a motion on the ground of newly discovered
evidence might be made before expiration of the time for appeal. Subdivision (c) fixed the time for serving affidavits. Subdivision (d) provided that the court on its own initiative might order a new trial not
later than three days after entry of judgment, and that the order specify
the grounds therefor. Rule 60 (b) was modeled on federal rule 60 (b)
and contained a sentence impliedly retaining the writ of error coram
nobis.
The United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules
of Criminal Procedure had previously received a number of suggestions
from judges and lawyers. The Committee for the Southern District
of Florida suggested that motions for new trials be permitted to be
made orally and taken down in shorthand by the court reporter. Four
to five days were to be allowed in which to move, and release from
custody pending decision was to be forbidden. Nathan April, of New
York, suggested that the rules deal with the subject matter of motions
for new trial. Frederick F. Faville, of Iova, favored a ten-day period
for the motion, the appearance bond to be in full force in the meantime.
The Committee for the Eastern District of New York also favored at
least a ten-day period. The Committee for the District of New Jersey
suggested that the scope of the new trial granted at the defendant's request should not be confined to particular offenses of which he was
convicted in the first trial if he had been charged with a higher degree
of that offense.
Rule 80 of the second draft, dated January 12, 1942, made a
number of important changes. Under subdivision (a) motions for new

trials were to be "determined promptly." Under subdivision (2) a
new trial might be granted "whenever required in the interests of
justice." The rule no longer provided for a new trial as to only part
of the issues. Under subdivision (c) the motion was to be made
"within three days after verdict or finding of guilt." Under subdivision
(d) a motion solely upon the ground of newly discovered evidence
might be made within one year after final judgment. A suggestion
was offered that the Committee ultimately adopt the view that there

be no time limit at all. This was the view of a number of lawyers in
the Department of Justice. Under existing law the only recourse is a
pardon. Pardon is neither a satisfactory nor a logical solution. Such
cases would be rare and the courts would not abuse the power conferred. Subdivision (e) provided that the court might order a new
trial on its own initiative. Rule 82(b) replacing rule 60(b) was
silent as to the possibility of writ of error coram nobis.
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Rule 93 of the third draft, dated March 4, 1942, was substantially
similar. But subdivision (e) removed all time limits upon the motion
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Subdivision (d) allowed extension of time within the three-day period as
to the usual motion for a new trial. In regard to coram nobis, rule
91(b) was similar to rule 82(b) of the previous draft.
Rule 48 of the fourth draft, dated May 18, 1942, made no changes
except that it omitted the subdivision on granting a new trial on the
initiative of the court. Rule 46(b) was like rule 91(b) of the previous
draft.
Rule 48 of the fifth draft, dated June 1942, made no changes,
except that it referred to the court's vacating judgment instead of
opening judgment after trial without a jury. Rule 46(b) was like
rule 46(b) of the previous draft in permitting the court to modify or
vacate a judgment entered through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect. This draft was submitted to the Supreme Court for comment
by it. The Court as a whole offered no comments or suggestions as
to rule 48. A single judge regarded as questionable the language of
rule 48(b) providing: "If the trial was without a jury, the court may
vacate the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
and direct the entry of a new judgment." As to rule 46 the Court
queried: "What is the force of the words 'surprise' and 'inadvertence'
and 'neglect' as used in this rule? Does 'mistake' mean mistake of
fact or law or both, and should correction of error for mistake be
limited to a six-months' period"?
Rule 31 (d) of the sixth draft, dated the winter of 1942-1943, was
not very different. It omitted the earlier provision calling for prompt
determination of motions for a new trial. Its first sentence made it
clear that the court might grant a new trial on its own initiative, in
providing as follows: "The court may grant a new trial to a defendant
whenever required in the interest of justice." Subdivision (b) of
rule 31 was designed to continue the practice of the common-law writ
of error coram nobis. In full the subdivision read as follows:
"The court may modify or vacate a judgment or an order
entered through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain a motion or
proceeding to modify or vacate a judgment or order. A motion
prescribed by this rule does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. The motion is not barred by the affirmance
of the judgment by an appellate court. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time but in no case more than six months after
the entry of the judgment or order."
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The note to rule 31 (b) referred to a proposed subdivision (c) prepared
by the late Professor George H. Dession entitled "Duress, fraud,
prejudicial irregularity" which read as follows:
"On motion the court, upon such terms as are just, may
vacate or modify a judgment, order, or proceeding on the ground
of duress, fraud, or prejudicial irregularity. The motion shall
be made with reasonable diligence after discovery of or convenient
opportunity to assert the grounds."
This provision was intended to replace the writ of error coram nobis,
but was not adopted by the Committee.
Rule 31(c) of a draft, dated March, 1943, known as the "preliminary draft" between the sixth and seventh drafts was substantially
identical with rule 31(d) of the sixth draft. A statement for submission to the Supreme Court was filed by four members of the Advisory Committee, Professors Dession, Glueck, Orfield, and Wechsler,
criticizing rule 31 (c) for not giving sufficient protection to the criminal
defendant because the grounds for a new trial with no time limit were too
narrow. The statement was as follows:
"The rule recommended by the Committee provides that the
court may grant a new trial 'whenever required in the interest of
justice.' A motion for a new trial based solely upon the ground
of newly discovered evidence may be made at any time. A motion
based upon some other ground must, however, be made within
three days after verdict or finding or within such further time as
the court may fix during the three-day period.
"We are in full agreement with the rule insofar as it thus
provides a broad basis for granting new trials when required in
the interest of justice; and, further, insofar as it eliminates a time
limit on motions for new trial based upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence. We believe, however, that the rule should
go further. A conviction of crime should not be permitted to
stand at any time if achieved by fraud, duress or other gross
impropriety. This, indeed, is substantially the present law, except
that the remedy available is the extraordinary writ of habeas
corpus (see Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 701 [1942]), there
being as yet no authoritative decision by the Supreme Court on the
availability of the writ of error coram nobis (Wells v. United

States, No. 11, Original, decided March 1, 1943). As a device
for correcting gross injustices the motion for a new trial is in
our judgment superior to the writ of habeas corpus. The motion
would be made in the court by which the judgment was rendered;

the writ is ordinarily sought elsewhere. The fact that the writ,
if sustained, results in an order of release may conceivably present
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double jeopardy problems in the event of a new trial. We think,
therefore, that there would be substantial gain if most of the contentions now presented after conviction on habeas corpus could
be presented upon a motion for a new trial. To be sure, the
elimination of a time limit on motions for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence goes a long distance towards meeting
the problem. In most cases, evidence of fraud or gross impropriety would, if available, be presented within the time allowed;
if not then available the evidence would necessarily be newly discovered. There may, however, be cases in which evidence of
duress, and perhaps even of fraud or gross impropriety, is not
newly discovered evidence and where by reason of ignorance or
neglect the point was not made within the three-day or extended
period otherwise permitted for motions for new trial. To permit
such cases to be litigated on motion rather than on habeas corpus,
we propose that the motion for new trial available without time
limitation be extended to include not only motions based upon
newly discovered evidence, but also those based 'upon the grounds
of fraud, duress or other gross impropriety.'
"To achieve this result we suggest that paragraph (c) of rule
31 be amended as follows:
"(c) For New Trial. The court may grant a new trial to a
defendant whenever required in the interest of justice. . . . A
motion for new trial based solely upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, fraud, duress, or other gross impropriety may
be made at any time before or after final judgment, but if an appeal
is pending the trial court may grant the motion only on remand
of the case. .
"
To this proposal a reply memorandum for the majority of the
Committee stated:
"The Committee adopted a rule the effect of which is to
abolish all time limits on motions for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. There were two reasons for this action.
First, it seemed illogical that there should be a time limit on such
an application, since the motion cannot be made until the evidence
is discovered. Irrespective of when the evidence comes to light,
if it is sufficient to warrant a reopening of the case, such relief
should be granted. Second, experience has shown that in fact
cases have occurred in which new evidence was discovered a considerable time after conviction and that such evidence led to the
conclusion that a miscarriage of justice had resulted. It seemed to
the Committee that judicial redress should be afforded in such
cases and that executive clemency was neither a satisfactory nor
adequate remedy from the standpoint of the Government or from
the point of view of the defendant.
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"The additional statement while not objecting to the foregoing
provision suggests that it should be carried still further, namely,
that it should be extended to motions for a new trial based on
fraud, duress, or other gross impropriety.
"It was the view of the majority of the Committee that the
reasons which warranted an abolition of all time limits on motions
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, would
not apply to motions for a new trial based on fraud, duress, or other
gross improprieties, since the evidence of such facts would naturally

be known at the time they transpired. Moreover, it seemed that
the last mentioned proposal might open the flood gates wide to
applications made years after the trial when some of the participants may no longer be available or their recollections may be
partially faded."
Rule 31(c) of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May, 1943 (the
seventh committee draft) was similar in its provision for new trial.
The last sentence of the prior draft, providing in part that "if an appeal
is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case
made at any time before final judgment" was changed to omit the
words "made at any time before final judgment." The Committee Note
to rule 31(c) pointed out that Criminal Appeals rule 2(3) was not
followed on the subject of remand because the latter limits the time
for remand. The proposed rule would drop this limitation because of
two other proposed provisions removing time limitations, namely, the
provision that a motion for a new trial based solely on newly discovered
evidence may be made at any time, and the provision of rule 41(c) as
to time. The last sentence of the subdivision also changed the word
"entertain" to "grant." Under the existing practice, application for
remand would have to be made to the appellate court and the remand
granted before the trial court could entertain the motion for a new trial.
The provision that if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the
motion only on remand was intended to change the existing practice
pursuant to which a remand must be secured before the motion for a
new trial is made in the trial court. Under the proposed rule a motion
could be made without securing a remand. But, if the trial court
should decide to grant the motion a remand would be necessary prior
to the order granting the motion. The proposed rule thus would
eliminate the need of a remand in those cases in which the trial court
decided to deny a motion for a new trial. The Committee Note also
pointed out that "no express provision is made with respect either to
providing for relief or barring relief under the common-law writ of
error coram nobis." The language of rule 31 (b) of the sixth draft
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on modification or vacation of judgments was omitted.
drafts after the sixth draft deal with this subject.

None of the

Rule 35 of the Second Preliminary Draft, dated February, 1944
(the eighth committee draft), made some changes. A separate rule
was now devoted exclusively to new trial. The time for making the
motion in the usual case was changed from three to five days and the
court could extend the time within such five days. There was to be
no time limit either on the ground "that the defendant has been deprived of a constitutional right" or on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, and the word "solely" as to the latter was omitted. Rule 35
of the Report of the Advisory Committee, dated July, 1944 (ninth
draft), was similar in effect, the third and fourth sentences being transposed in order. But the Supreme Court rejected the provision for no
time limit as to newly discovered evidence and deprivation of constitutional right. Only Justice Murphy accepted the committee view.
Instead the rule provided that a motion for a new trial "based on the
ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within
two years after final judgment." Because two prior proposed rules,
rule 15 on pre-trial procedure and rule 16 on notice of alibi, were rejected by the Court, the final rule became rule 33.
The following comments were made to the Advisory Committee on
the rule as it appeared in the First Preliminary Draft (seventh draft).
Edwin R. Holmes, of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
objected to the want of a time limit on new trials because of newly
discovered evidence: "Rules like this prevent the speedy determination
of any case where the defendant is wealthy enough to keep up the
procedure in court." I Judge Harvey M. Johnsen, of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, approved of the provision allowing the
trial court to entertain a motion for a new trial on appeal without
remand. Walter C. Lindley, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Illinois, subsequently a member of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, opposed the unlimited time for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: "Years may lapse,
witnesses may die and other events occur so as to alter completely the
nature of the proof and the result of the trial. I am not in favor of
such never-ending unsettlement of court judgments." 2 Former Attorney General Homer Cummings in an address before the American
Bar Association defended the rule of no time limit,' because evidence
1. I COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED CONCERNING THE
PROPOSED RULES Or CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 197 (1943).

2. Ibid.
3. Id. at 198.
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is sometimes discovered long after the trial and pardon, an inadequate
and unsatisfactory remedy, is the only remedy available under existing
law. He was not afraid "that the courts will be inundated by a flood
of frivolous motions of this kind. We may well rely on the good sense
of federal judges not to grant such motions except upon sufficient cause."
Daniel M. Lyons, Pardon Attorney of the Department of Justice, took
the same position. Chief Justice James P. Alexander, of the Supreme
Court of Texas, was opposed to the removal of time limits, being of
the opinion that laches should bar the criminal defendant within a
reasonable time. He would permit amendment of a motion for a new
trial even after the normal time for moving for a new trial had
elapsed. Mr. A. Julius Freiberg, of Cincinnati, Ohio, put this question:
"Does the phrase 'finding of guilt' when there is no jury, mean the
judgment or does it mean the preliminary 'decision' (oral or written)
of the judge who tries the case" ? ' Mr. Jesse Slingluff, of Baltimore,
Maryland, pointed out that rule 31 (c) allowed-only three days in which
to move for a new trial while rule 27(b) provided that a motion for
acquittal might be joined with a motion for a new trial within ten days
after the jury is discharged. Thus a criminal defendant by a little
finagling could file his motion "within ten days after the jury's discharge." ' Mr. William Scott Stewart, of Chicago, would give the
defendant more time in which to apply for a new trial, but would allow
a new trial only on motion of the defendant since the trial court should
not have the power to grant a new trial on its own initiative. The
defendant might fear a worse result on a new trial. "Under the rule
as drafted the prosecutor might bring forth some new evidence if he
is not satisfied with the sentence, or the conduct of the defendant in
prison." 6 Judge H. Church Ford, of the Eastern District of Kentucky,
would clarify the rule so as not to be inconsistent with the rule on
judgment n.o.v. allowing ten days. The federal judges of Michigan
opposed the unlimited time for motion for a new trial in case of newly
discovered evidence. Mr. Thomas J. Morrissey, United States Attorney
for the District of Colorado, opposed the power of the trial judge within
the three-day period to extend the time for a motion for a new trial, for
this would produce delay. Mr. Edward M. Curran, United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia, favored the no-time-limit provision as to newly discovered evidence and cited an actual case where
the new rule would work justice, whereas under the existing rule only
4. Id. at 199.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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a pardon would lie.7 John T. Metcalf, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, would make the rule consistent with the
rule on judgment n.o.v. as to time.8 He was opposed to there being
no time limit as to newly discovered evidence. He also objected that
though the defendant must normally move within three days, nevertheless the judge acting on his own initiative could grant the motion at a
later time. Victor E. Anderson, United States Attorney for the District
of Minnesota, would increase the time limit from three days to five
days because in some instances, such as mail fraud cases, three days
would be too short a time in which to compile the necessary data.
The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the Brooklyn Bar
Association would increase the time limit to twenty days: "New trial
because of fraud, duress and gross impropriety should not be limited
in time." ' Mr. Stuart H. Steinbrink, of New York, pointed out the
need for fixing a similar time limit for new trials in rule 31(c) and in
the rule on judgment n.o.v. Judge MacSwinford, of Kentucky, would
limit the time for a new trial in all cases so that witnesses might be
released, saying also that the trial judge should not'have a longer time
in which to act on his own initiative than does the criminal defendant,
who is given only three days in the usual case. Joseph F. Deeb, United
States Attorney for the Western District of Michigan, insisted on a
time limit in all cases, saying that the prosecution might be unable to
conduct a new trial properly at an indefinite later date, and that pardon
is adequate for the rare cases of newly discovered evidence. Mr. Louis
J. Castellano, of Brooklyn, New York, favored the minority committee
proposal covering not only newly discovered evidence, but also fraud,
duress, or other gross impropriety.'
The Lawyers Club of Los
Angeles had some members who also favored the minority proposal,
and recommended further study. Mr. James E. Ruffin, of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, stated that aside
"from constitutional objections, I do not think the court should
be empowered to vacate a judgment in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case. I think this is going too far. It will discourage
defendants in waiving juries. There is no reason why the court
should not take as much time as it needs in the trial of a case, but
after judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant I think that
should terminate the matter as to that defendant."
The following comments were made on the Second Preliminary
Draft. The Judicial Conference of the Seventh Circuit adopted a
7. II id. at 479 (1944).

8. Id. at 480.
9. Id. at 481.

10. Id. at 482.
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motion that "it is the sense of this Conference that rule 35 be redrafted
so as to prevent presentation of motions for new trial or to vacate
a judgment of conviction at any time subsequent to the term at which
judgment was entered, for the reason that any rule to the contrary
destroys finality of judgments." " Judge Evan A. Evans, of the Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, agreed, as did Judge Robert C.
Baltzell, of the Southern District of Indiana, and Judge Charles G.
Briggle, of the Southern District of Illinois. Judge Briggle would
not allow the motion "after the defendant has entered upon the service
of his sentence." 12 He admitted, however, that the "writ of habeas
corpus would still be open to any defendant under proper circum-

stances."

Judge William J. Campbell, of the Northern District of

Illinois, Judge F. Ryan Duffy, of the Eastern District of Wisconsin,

and Judge Walter C. Lindley, of the Eastern District of Illinois, all
objected to the no-time-limit provision.
At The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit a motion by
Judge Leibell, of the Southern District of New York, fixing a time limit
of five years for new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence
was seconded and lost; but his motion fixing a time limit of five years
in cases of deprivation of constitutional rights was seconded and
,carried. 18 Judge Robert C. Bell, of the District of Minnesota, was
opposed to no time limit: "In many cases when the convict thinks the
Government no longer has evidence to convict, he is going to discover
new evidence." 14 Judge John B. Sanborn, of the Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit, objected to the provision for no time limit as to

newly discovered evidence and denial of constitutional rights. In his
,opinion, there should be some finality to judgments in criminal cases
so that a trial court does not become a perpetual court of review of
its own judgments. He felt the proposed rule would not substantially
benefit innocent defendants, and that guilty defendants would delay
their motions until the Government was no longer able to convict.
Innocent men if convicted have every incentive to act promptly. Judgments should become final within a reasonable time after entry. The
remedies by way of pardon, commutation of sentence, and parole are
adequate, and encourage prisoners to behave well. "In view of existing
release procedures, I think it is unnecessary to guard against every
possibility that justice may miscarry." 15 One year should be long
11. III id. at 141.
12. Id. at 142.

13. Id. at 143.
14. Ibid.

15. Id. at 144.
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enough. The remedies provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure as
to correcting, modifying and setting aside sentences should be made
exclusive so that all may know what authority the courts possess. The
ancient writ of error coram nobis should not be perpetuated. However,
the remedy of habeas corpus cannot and should not be impaired by the
rules. Mr. Robert P. Butler, United States Attorney for the District
of Connecticut, thought that abolishing the time limitation would result
in opening the door to unlimited fraud, as the Government would find
it impossible to prove its case a long time after trial. Mr. George E. Q.
Johnson, Chairman of a Bar Committee for the Seventh Circuit and a
former United States Attorney, opposed the no-time-limit provision
and favored a three-year limitation. 6. The personnel of a United
States Attorney's office change every five or six years. Thus, no one
in the office may have knowledge of a case tried long ago. Usually
the files do not disclose all the facts. Frequently there is not available a
transcript of the evidence except as to appealed cases. Some criminal
practitioners are unscrupulous. Defendants serving time will not
hesitate to perjure themselves, and can induce other persons to perjure
for them. If there is no time limit witnesses will be hounded by associates of hardened criminals to make affidavits changing their testimony. Witnesses are often hard to obtain for the first trial and will be
even harder to get if there is no time limit so that they may be
approached by criminal defendants for an indefinite period. Even jurors
have been approached for affidavits. After three years executive clemency should be adequate Mr. Joseph E. Tierney, of Wisconsin, favored
a rule providing that when a new trial is granted, such trial would
proceed as if there had been no former trial. A Wisconsin statute so
provided. Judge George A. Moore, of the Eastern District of Missouri,
would provide a reasonable time limitation 17 as would Judge Fred L.
Wham, of the Eastern District of Illinois. 8 As to newly discovered
evidence the proposed rule would encourage lack of diligence as well as
delay. As to constitutional rights the rule would encourage late motions
in the light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions even though the
defendant had not objected at the trial. Where fees were available the
rule would encourage replowing of possible constitutional questions.
There would be a flood of cases just as there have been a flood of cases
in the light of recent expansions of habeas corpus. Judge A. F. St.
Sure, of the Northern District of California, favored a time limit of
ninety days after final judgment, since habeas corpus has been expanded
16. Id. at 145.
17. Id. at 146.
18. Id. at 147.
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to take care of the situations contemplated by the proposed rule.' 9
Mr. John E. Byrne, of the Bar Committee of the Seventh Circuit,
favored a three-year limit, and made a statement similar to that of
Mr. George E. Q. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee. Mr. Harry
C. Blanton, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri,
favored a time limit of sixty days as set forth in rule 2 (3) of the
Supreme Court rules governing criminal cases after verdict.2 °
II.
HISTORY OF NEW TRIAL IN ENGLAND.

New trials in civil cases were granted in England as early as the
fourteenth century. But they were not granted in criminal cases until
the end of the seventeenth century. 2' After 1673 new trials were
granted to criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases. The developing
concept of double jeopardy prevented the development of a rule permitting the prosecution to move for a new trial after an acquittal. The
grounds for a new trial were extensive in scope and included errors in
the exclusion or admission of evidence, improper instructions, a verdict
against the weight of the evidence, or the furtherance of the ends of
justice. No new trial could be granted in felony cases, though the
writ of error coram nobis was available in the limited category of errors
of fact.
Motion for a new trial was not made before the judge who tried
the case but before the King's Bench sitting en banc. Under section 20
of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, the power to grant a new trial
was abolished.22 Even prior to this statute the remedy of new trial
was limited in scope except in case of summary jurisdiction since it
was available only in cases tried by the King's Bench, and furthermore,
it was not available as to felonies.
At the present time a new trial cannot be ordered even though the
23
defendant appears to be clearly guilty, except after an abortive trial.
19. Ibid. He cited Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) ; Mooney v. Holohan,

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
20. IV id. at 77.
21. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 495, 496
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 17, 18 (1939).

(1947);

22. The procedure just before it was abolished is described in ARCHIBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 291-294 (23d ed. 1905). The defendant might move for an order nisi within eight days after the trial before a divisional
court of the King's Bench Division. The court could extend the time in which the
motion could be made. The motion was made on the judge's notes of the trial or upon
affidavit. The presence of the defendant seems to have been necessary.
23. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 520 (Turner ed. 1952). In Canada the

trial court may not order a new trial, but the appellate court may do so. Riddell, New

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol2/iss3/1

12

Orfield: New Trial in Federal Criminal Cases
APRIL

1957]

NEW TRIAL IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

305

The English law distinguishes between new trial which is abolished,
and venire de novo which is retained. A venire de novo may be granted:
(1) before the completion of the first trial if the judge saw fit to discharge the first jury; (2) where a special verdict has been returned on
which the appellate court could not enter judgment for either party; (3)
by a court of error in cases of mistrial for treason, felony, or misdemeanor. 4
There has been a movement in recent years to confer on the Court
of Criminal Appeal the power to grant a new trial. But an official
committee report of April 10, 1954, has opposed it except in cases of
newly discovered evidence. 5 It seems to have been felt that finality and
speedy justice are essential and that a second trial would be prejudicial
to the criminal defendant. Though these elements are ignored in case
of a mistrial they should not be ignored in other cases. The committee
was divided five to three. The minority members were judges, while
the majority members were practitioners. It should be noted that the
reform movement in England is in the direction of giving the appellate
court power to grant a new trial, but of giving no such power to the
trial court.
III.
GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL.

(a). History. The Constitution is silent with respect to any right
to a new trial in criminal cases. Only the collateral remedy of habeas
corpus is guaranteed, as article I, section 9, provides: "The privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases
of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." Thus, there
seems to be'no constitutional right to a new trial. As the Supreme
Court of Kansas stated: "in no case is it held to be a constitutional
grant. It is a privilege offered by the law to the accused, in addition to
the guarantees offered by the Constitution." 2 However, Congress, in
1789, promptly provided for new trials.2 Therefore, it has been stated:
Trials in Present Practice, 27 YALE L. 3. 353, 359-360 (1918). The same is true as to
the appellate courts in Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon. Goodhart, Acquitting the
Guilty, 70 L.Q. REV. 514, 520 (1954).
24. ARCHIBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 342-343 (32d ed.
1949) ; RoscoE, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 250, 271, 283, 325 (16th ed. 1952). It is not easy
to distinguish mere irregularities in the proceedings resulting in final discharge of the
defendant from completely null proceedings resulting in another trial. The Court of
Criminal Appeal does not always order a new trial even if the proceedings were a
nullity.

25. Goodhart, Acquitting the Guilty, 70 L.Q. REV. 514 (1954) ; Williams, Report of
the Departmental Committee on New Trials in Criminal Cases, 17 MODERN L. REV. 454

(1954).

26. State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232 (1871).
27. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
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"The right to move for a new trial, and to have the motion considered
upon the reasons presented for it, is an absolute one, and the granting
or refusal thereof does not rest in the discretion of the court." 2
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the granting of new trials
for "reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in courts of
law." 2 This was early held to include cases in which a federal criminal
defendant had been convicted and sought a new trial.8" There was a
81
single contrary decision by Justice Story sitting as a circuit judge.
Justice Story thought that the jeopardy provision would be violated,
but the other decisions concluded that there would be jeopardy only if
there had been an acquittal. The right to a new trial existed even in
capital cases, whereas in England it had been confined to misdemeanors.
May the trial court, after conviction, grant a new trial on its own
initiative? The wording of rule 33 seems broad enough to permit this. 2
But, if the defendant were to object to the new trial, it would seem
that he need not undergo it as he has been in jeopardy and has not
waived his jeopardy by moving for a new trial. It has been said that
a new trial may not be granted to the prejudice of the defendant. 3
"It may be admitted that the new trial could be granted only with the
assent of the prisoner." " A new trial should not be ordered even in
a capital case if the defendant objects."5 Likewise a defendant need
not accept a pardon.86
(b). Interest of Justice. The first sentence of rule 33 permits the
court to grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice." This
means that the court may grant a new trial if it "reaches the conclusion
that a miscarriage of justice has resulted." 17 But "justice" is "not a
sentimental concept which each person may have as to right or wrong
28. Ogden v. United States, 112 Fed. 523, 525 (3d Cir. 1902).
29. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
30. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) ; Knarf v. United States, 156
U.S. 151, 175 (1895); United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15301, at 137
(C.C.D. Pa. 1846) ; United States v. Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15510, at 687 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1839) ; United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15321, at 211 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) ; United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5126, at 918, 921, 923 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
31. United States v. Gibert, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15204, at 1297 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834).
32. At least the trial court may suggest a motion for new trial. Gourdian v. United
States, 154 Fed. 453, 460 (7th Cir. 1907).
33. United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5126, at 921 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799). Opinion was by Iredell sitting as a circuit judge.
34. United States v. Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15510, at 689 (C.C. Ind. 1839). The
new trial is granted "for his benefit."
35. United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15301, at 137 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846).
At p. 138 the court warned the defendant who had been convicted of manslaughter that
on a new trial he could be convicted of murder.
36. United States v. Wilson, 7 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
37. United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D. Hawaii 1949).
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with relation to a given cause, or any duty he may have in connection
with it, but it is an impartial, fair and reasonable application of prescriptions of law both vengeful and protective." "8 This provision of the
rule is broader in scope as to grounds than that part of the rule allowing
a new trial for newly discovered evidence. 9 Insufficient evidence is
Judge Jerome Frank has
occasionally referred to as such ground.'
concluded that when, on motion for a new trial, the trial judge has the
gravest doubts as to the credibility of a witness, he has the power to
grant a new trial as he is then acting "in the interest of justice." 41
The power of the trial court is very great for when it grants a new trial

the prosecution can take no appeal, and no other remedy seems available
to the prosecution. However, the cases do not reveal that the federal
courts have been guilty of our American "practice of new trial on the
slightest provocation." 42
(c). Qualifications, bias, and conduct of jury. That trial by jury is
productive of many new trials may readily be seen by the large number
of cases under this heading.
It is not a ground for a new trial that the jury panel was drawn
from the whole of the federal district excluding one county when it
appears that impartial jurors could not have been obtained from that
Further, a new trial will not be granted on the ground that
county.'
the jury panel from which the jury which tried the defendant was
drawn was illegally selected, since objection should have been made by
challenge to the array before trial."
Where the fact of a juror's conviction of violating the National
Prohibition Act furnished objection to him as a qualified juror, such
objection was mere propter defectum and could not be assigned as
ground for a new trial.4 5 Furthermore, a disqualification which could
have been discovered before verdict by reasonable diligence may not
38. Ibid.

39. Benton v. United States, 188 F.2d 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
40. United States v. Frankfeld, 103 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Md. 1952) ; United States
v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D. Hawaii 1949).
41. United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 404, 405 (2d Cir. 1954) (dissenting
opinion). The case involved newly discovered evidence.
42. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 406 (1904).
43. United States v. Clark, 19 F. Supp. 972, 973 (W.D. Mo. 1937).

44. United States v. Peterson, 24 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
45. Spivey v. United States, 109 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
631 (1940). 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1952) now makes a person incompetent to serve as a
juror if "he has been convicted in a state or federal court of record of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored by pardon or amnesty."
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be attacked by motion for a new trial. Also the deafness of a juror
must be objected to before verdict, as must his alienage or infancy. 46
Misnomer of a juror is not necessarily a ground for a new trial when
it appears that the juror who served was the one summoned, and actually attended in good faith. 7
An improper sustaining of the prosecution's challenge of jurors
for cause is not ground for a new trial so long as an impartial jury is
obtained. 4' However, where defendant's peremptory challenges have
been exhausted, and his challenge for cause is improperly overruled,
he may have ground for a new trial.49 A new trial was granted where,
before trial, a juror had expressed the opinion that the defendant should
be hanged." It is not ground for a new trial that a sister of one of the
jurors was married to an uncle of the Assistant United States Attorney
who presented the case."' Where an experienced trial judge declares
that the jury returning a verdict did not understand the case at all, this,
without more, justifies a new trial.5 2 The defendant is entitled to a
jury possessing sufficient understanding of the case to return a pertinent,
adequate, and coherent verdict.
Where a juror repeatedly lunches during the trial with a witness
for the prosecution, a new trial may be granted." But a new trial was
denied where a juror rode from the courthouse with a prosecuting
witness and boarded at the same place during trial."4 The mere fact
that a government witness and a juror winked at each other when
the jurors were handed a certain defense exhibit was not ground for
a new trial where the defendant failed to move for a mistrial. 5 Bias
warranting a new trial is not made out merely on evidence that the
jury foreman was unfriendly to two of the defendants because one of
them had several times arrested his brother and the other had testified
against him, when the foreman denied any bias, and the defendants
knowing all the facts accepted the juror without challenge. 6
46. United States v. Baker, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14498, at 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1868).
47. Chadwick v. United States, 141 Fed. 225, 243 (6th Cir. 1905).
48. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 470 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900). Fourteen
of defendant's twenty peremptory challenges remained unused.
49. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 471 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900).
50. United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. No. 5126, at 918 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
51. Garland v. United States, 182 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1950). The court stated:
"It is well settled generally that relationship to the prosecuting attorney does not disqualify a juror."
52. United States v. Di Matteo, 169 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1948).
53. United States v. Marine, 84 F. Supp. 785, 787 (D. Del.. 1949). The court
stated that the crucial inquiry is the influence on the juror and not the importance of
the witness' testimony.
54. United States v. Dunbar, 17 Fed. 793 (E.D. Wis. 1883).
55. United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp, 771, 775 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
56. Lancaster v. United States, 39 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1930).
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Bias may arise because of communication between jurors and
officers in charge of the jury. However, in a case in which the jury
had agreed on verdicts of guilty as to all defendants, and while the
foreman was signing the verdicts, the bailiff came to the door of the
judge's chamber and informed him that the jury wanted to know
whether all counts had to be accounted for, and the bailiff under direction of the court gave the jury an affirmative answer, and defendants
and their counsel were informed but did not object, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trialY
Where there have been communications to the jury during its
deliberation it is said that there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
to the defendant. In some cases this presumption may be overcome by
evidence offered by the Government at the hearing on the motion for
a new trial."8 When the jurors testify on the matter the court need
not base its conclusion entirely on their testimony. 9 Where the
Government admitted that a communication between the jury and the
bailiff during the jury's deliberation had taken place and offered no
proof other than the affidavit of the bailiff as to harmlessness, a new
trial was granted.'
Failure to have a bailiff placed in charge of a
jury specially sworn is not ground for a new trial even in felony cases."'
The Supreme Court held many years ago that the reading by the
jurors of a newspaper which is adverse to the defendant may be a
ground for a new trial. 2 Yet, it was common to say that the "mere
fact that jurors have read newspaper accounts of the trial in which they
are participants is not ground for a new trial."
If a newspaper account of the trial is read by a juror, but contains nothing prejudicial to
the defendant, a motion for a new trial will not be granted.6 4 Even
57. United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 794 (1946). Here the better procedure would have been for the jury to be
escorted to the judge to receive its instructions directly from him.
58. Chambers v. United States, 237 Fed. 513, 521 (8th Cir. 1916). The court stated
that this was the weight of authority and the better reasoning. It cited Holmgren v.

United States, 217 U.S. 509, 521-522 (1910); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140,

149 (1892).
59. United States v. Rakes, 74 F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D. Va. 1947).
60. Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1943). The bailiff is

not to serve as an agent of the court to convey instructions to the jury as to how the
jury is to proceed in considering the various counts of the indictment. The jury should
be brought to the courtroom in the presence of the defendant and the attorneys.

61. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 469 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900). The regular

official oath may suffice. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 674 (1896).
62. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147 (1892); United States v. Reid,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851) (no prejudice shown hence no new trial granted).
See Note, 63 HARv. L. REV. 84,0, 846-848 (1950).
63. Bratcher v. United States, 149 F.2d 742, 746 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
885 (1945). It was said to be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rossi
v. United States, 278 Fed. 349, 355 (9th Cir. 1922).
64. United States v. Francis, 144 Fed. 520, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1906).
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where the jurors separated and then read the account a new trial was
denied.6" An affidavit of publication of excerpts from newspapers,
plus the excerpts themselves, are immaterial without evidence other than
that of the jurors, tending to show that they were read by them. 66
But, affidavits of jurors that they read the articles should on principle
7
be admissible.
The fact that the jurors have read newspaper articles hostile to
the defendant during the trial is not a ground for a new trial where
there is no proof that the jury's misconduct was occasioned by the
Government, and where counsel for defendant made no objection at the
time though he knew all the facts."
However, a failure by the trial
court, on request of defendant's counsel, to ask the jurors whether they
had read and been influenced by a derogatory newspaper article, has
been held to be a ground for a new trial.6 Where a newspaper published
a report of a trial and the statement of the prosecuting attorney, but
the two jurors who saw the article stated that they could disregard
anything read and base the verdict solely on the evidence, and the
court admonished them to so disregard, a denial of the motion for a
new trial was not reversed on appeal."0 The fact that two jurors had
read newspaper articles about the case did not warrant a mistrial or a
new trial when they swore that they had read only parts of the articles,
remembered but little of the contents, and that they would not be influenced by them, especially since the court had instructed the jury to
consider only evidence presented in court.7 '
The defendant has the burden of proving that he was prejudiced
by reason of the jury's cognizance of a newspaper article which stated
that the defendant had been previously acquitted in a prosecution for
another crime. 72 There must be some evidence that at least some of
the jurors read the articles.73 In a recent case the government witnesses
did not testify in accordance with statements previously made to FBI
agents, and, while the prosecution was in progress, the district judge
65. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 250 (1910).
66. Stewart v. United States, 300 Fed. 769, 788 (8th Cir. 1924).
67. Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 840, 847 (1950).
68. Langer v. United States, 76 F.2d 817, 827 (8th Cir. 1935).
69. Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904, 909 (6th Cir. 1953).
70. Reining v. United States, 167 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
830 (1948).
71. United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824, 825 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
72. Gicinto v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mo. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d
8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 844 (1954). The newspaper also referred to the fact
of an indictment for the same type of offense in another federal district.
73. Welch v. United States, 135 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. ), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
769 (1943).
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on his own motion issued bench warrants for the witnesses charging
them with perjury. The action of the judge was publicized in newspapers in the area from which the jurors were taken. It was held that
since no instruction was given the jury against possible prejudice from
reading newspaper articles the defendant was entitled to a new trial.74
The question was not whether any actual wrong resulted, but whether
a condition had been created from which prejudice might arise or from
which the general public would suspect that the jury might be influenced
to reach a verdict through bias or prejudice.
The denial of a motion for a new trial based on the ground that
two jurors in a narcotics prosecution visited the defendant's place of
business where opium was found was held not reversible on appeal,
where the facts showed no prejudice to the defendants. 75 Where during
a recess a juror overhears the remark of an interpreter that the defendant was lying but is not influenced by the remark, the trial court need
not grant a new trial.7 6
Separation of the jury is not always ground for a new trial. For
example, during the deliberations of the jury they were taken to dinner
by the bailiffs and two of them were taken back because of illness, but
they did not communicate with anyone. Denial of a new trial was
affirmed.77 Even where the jurors separated and read newspapers a
78
new trial was denied.
Where one of the jurors procured a copy of the federal statutes from
the bailiff while the jury was deliberating on the verdict, this was not
ground for a new trial where it did not appear that such misconduct
Supported only by the statement of the
influenced the verdict.79
defendant's attorney, a motion for a new trial on the ground that an
excused juror, after being excused, entered the jury room and improperly influenced the jury is not ground for a new trial."0 Where a
juror, who had been offered a bribe by someone to "hang" the jury,
although he had been admonished by the trial judge not to disclose
74. Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1955). Furthermore, defendant
did not waive his right to a mistrial because he replied in the negative when asked by
the trial judge if defendant wanted the judge to question the jurors about reading the
articles.
75. Ng Sing v. United States, 8 F.2d 919. 922 (9th Cir. 1925) ; see also Roberts v.
United States, 60 F.2d, 871, 872 (4th Cir. 1932).
76. Fook v. United States, 164 F.2d 716, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
838 (1948).
77. Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S.
737 (1926) ; see also United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 467 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900).
78. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 250 (1910).
79. Colt v. United States, 190 Fed. 305, 308 (8th Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S.
729 (1912).
80. United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
860 (1948).
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this to anyone, nevertheless disclosed it to at least five jurors after long
deliberation, and a verdict was then shortly returned, defendant was
entitled to a new trial even though the jurors testified that the information did not affect their verdict."' A new trial has been granted when
someone has attempted improperly to influence the jury in favor of
the defendant.'
(d).

Misconduct of prosecuting attorney. In general, the prosecuting

attorney should abstain from conversation with the jury. However, a
mere mention by the prosecuting attorney to a juror that the jurors
were to get a vacation due to a court recess was not ground for a new
trial where the court admonished against such conduct and the defendant was invited to move for a mistrial, but declined. '
Mere friendly
contact between the prosecuting attorney and a juror, easily ascertainable on voir dire is not a ground for a new trial.8 4 Where a new trial is
sought on the basis of private communications between the prosecution
and jurors, such conduct must be closely scrutinized, and the trial judge
should grant a new trial where there is any significant doubt as to
whether the presumption of prejudice has been overcome.8"
The conduct of the United States attorney in asking the trial court
to take action when a government witness repudiates a sworn statement
given to government agents is not ground for a new trial when it is
obvious that the witness was not telling the truth. 6
While misconduct on summation is more common than misconduct
on opening statement, misconduct as to the latter may also be a ground
for granting a new trial.8 7 In a prosecution for failure to pay an
income tax, argument by the Government that defendant acknowledged
that he openly violated state laws and, therefore, violated the federal
income tax law was improper but did not warrant a new trial.87 a
81.
82.
ground.
83.

United States v. Rakes, 74 F. Supp. 645, 648 (E.D. Va. 1947).
Ibid. But the appellate court expressed no opinion as to the propriety of this
Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1947).
United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Pa. 1953) ; see Note,

Forensic Misconduct, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1954).

84. Turner v. United States, 222 F.2d 926, 933 (4th Cir. 1955). The prosecuting
attorney gave the juror a ride to court just before the trial, but not during the trial. He
joined the juror's request that he be excused from serving on the jury.
85. Ryan v. United States, 191 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, Duncan
v. United States, 342 U.S. 928 (1952). On the particular facts no new trial was
thought necessary as the presumption of prejudice had been rebutted. The court ruled
that the jurors might properly testify whether or not they were biased by the communications which occurred during recesses in the trial.
86. United States v. Caserta, 104 F. Supp. 661, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
87. Minker v. United States, 85 F.2d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 1936), reversing 12 F.
Supp. 783 (M.D. Pa. 1935). The prosecutor stated that the government would not have
indicted defendant had he not been guilty.
87a. United States v. Johnson, 129 F.2d 954, 962 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S.
189 (1943). The Supreme Court did not discuss this phase of the case. On improper
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Likewise, argument that such defendant had dragged the political party
of his county down into the mire and that the jury should save the
people of the county from the disgrace of having the defendant as their
leader was improper but did not warrant a new trial. There is much
authority that argument by the government to the jury must be objected to at once, and cannot be raised for the first time on motion for
a new trial.8 8
(e). Violation of right to counsel. In general, error in judgment,
incompentency or mismanagement of defense by counsel is not a ground
for a new trial.89 Defendant must also show that the purported representation by counsel was such as to make the trial a farce and a mockery
of justice. But, the defendant is entitled to effective assistance of
counsel.' He need not show that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if he had had counsel. 9' It should be noted that habeas
corpus and the writ of error coram nobis may be available.92
Counsel must have adequate time to prepare for trial. Where the
facts indicate that such time existed, no new trial will be granted.93 A
refusal by defendant's counsel to permit the defendant to testify, and
the failure to introduce certain other testimony is not of itself a ground
for a new trial.94 Where the motion for a new trial is based on newly
discovered evidence, proof of incompetence or negligence of counsel in
searching out the evidence may relieve the defendant of the requirement
of showing due diligence in the absence of which the motion would have
been defeated.95
Where defendants, whose interests were allegedly conflicting, had
separate counsel, and frequently during the trial one or more attorneys
were absent for brief periods, and another of the attorneys was substituted for such periods, and no defendant then objected, it was not
summation see Notes, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1936), 54 COLUM. L. Rrv. 946 (1954),
42 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 73 (1951). As to when the harmless error rule applies see
Note, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 450, 451-453 (1947).
88. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; Crumpton v.
United States, 138 U.S. 361, 364 (1891) ; Bratcher v. United States, 49 F.2d 742, 746
(4th Cir. 1945).
89. United States v. Hack, 205 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 1953); Burton v. United
States, 151 F.2d 17, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 789 (1946) ; United
States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27, 29 (D. N.J. 1954) ; see also BEANEY, THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTs 45-47 (1955) ; Note, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 115 (1947).
90. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1945).
91. Ibid.
92. Note, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 115, 117 (1947).
93. United States v. Lowrey, 84 F. Supp. 804, 806 (W.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 179
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1950).
94. Ingram v. United States, 209 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
95. Johnson v. United States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Here counsel had been
appointed by the court.
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necessary to grant a new trial. But, such procedure "is not one to be
commended." " If the situation requires counsel to present an inconsistent defense for a codefendant, this may be ground for a new
trial.
(f).

97

Various miscellaneous grounds. A new trial will not be granted

for error which did not prejudice the defendant." However, there will
be some cases in which the very nature of the error will serve as a
ground; that is to say, prejudice will be presumed. Also, there will be
other cases where the defendant has the burden of showing that he was
actually harmed. Ordinarily a defendant cannot complain of error
"which he himself created or invited." 99
If a search warrant is not valid and if the evidence which should
have accordingly been suppressed was material, the defendant is entitled
to a new trial.100 A refusal to permit cross-examination of an officer
as to the identity of an informer in order to determine the legality of a
search by the officer has also been held ground for a new trial.' 1 A
new trial was granted when the arrest and search without a warrant
were both illegal. 0 2 The matter of improper arrest may be raised by
the.regular motion for a new trial but not on a motion based on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.' 0 3
Failure of the indictment to charge an offense punishable by
federal law is not a ground for motion for a new trial,0 4 nor is an
untimely request for a bill of particulars.0 5 The defendant must show
that he is injured by a refusal of the bill of particulars." 6
When a codefendant, before impanelling of the jury, requests a
severance for trial and the evidence establishes that severance should
have been granted to insure a fair trial, a new trial will be granted.0 7
96. United States v. Simone, 205 F.2d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 1953). Clarke, J., concurred "with some doubt." Id. at 484.
97. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1945).
98. United States v. Evett, 65 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
99. United States v. Caplan, 123 F. Supp. 862, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
100. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
101. United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp 639, 645 (W.D. Ky. 1937) ; see McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 311 (1954) ; Notes, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 473, 477 (1956), 63 YALE
L.J. 206, 214 (1953).
102. United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1955).
103. United States v. Caplan, 91 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D.D.C. 1950).
104. United States v. Pruitt, 121 F. Supp. 15, 18 (S.D. Tex. 1954). A proper
remedy is motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) ; see also United States v.
Frank, 4 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. Pa. 1933) ; United States v. Stilson, 254 Fed. 120,
124 (E.D. Pa. 1918), aft'd, 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
105. United States v..Minker, 12 F. Supp. 783, 784 (M.D. Pa. 1935).
106. Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1937).
107. United States v. Decker, 51 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D. Md. 1943).
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In general, refusal of a motion for severance under rule 14 is reversible
error only if the trial judge abuses his discretion.'0 8 Where there are
several counts on which the defendant is tried, defendant is not entitled
to a new trial unless he has asked for severance for trial even though
the counts involve different proof. 10 9
It would seem that want of jurisdiction should be raised by motion
in arrest of judgment rather than by motion for a new trial. However.
in a decision in which the Supreme Court found that the trial court
had jurisdiction over an Indian no criticism of resort to motion for a
new trial was offered." 0
The refusal of the trial court to require the Government to inform
the defendant as to the order in which his case would be tried with
respect to three companion cases was not a ground for a new trial.-"
A trial by court when there has been no valid waiver of trial by
jury may be a ground for a new trial." 2 The discharge of a juror and
trial by eleven jurors without the consent of the defendant and in the
absence and without knowledge of the defendant is also a ground for a
new trial."3
Bias of the trial court is not a ground where the motion for a new
trial is supported only by the allegation and belief of the defendant, and
there is no motion for a change of venue or for a continuance." 4 A
refusal of the trial judge to disqualify himself where the affidavit of
the defendant is clearly sufficient is ground for a new trial, but if it is
not sufficient the defendant must show prejudice on appeal."'
Illness of the trial judge is not a ground for a new trial where the
record discloses that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
and that no remark of the judge influenced the verdict of the jury.'16
The mere supposition that the successor judge might impose a lighter
sentence was not a ground when defendant had a fair and impartial
trial.

11 7

108. Petro v. United States, 210 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Sharp v. United
States, 195 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1952).
109. United States v. Segelman, 86 F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
110. United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 557 (1894).
111. United States v. Walker, 19 F. Supp. 969, 970 (W.D. Mo. 1937); United
States v. Clark, 19 F. Supp. 972, 973 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
112. Bruno v. United States, 180 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1950). A valid waiver was
found. A new trial was granted in Colts v. District of Columbia, 38 F.2d 535 (D.C.
Cir. 1930).
113. United States v. Shaw, 59 Fed. 110 (D. Ky. 1893).
114. United States v. Richards, 1 Alaska 619 (D. Alaska 1902).
115. United States v. Buck, 23 F. Supp. 503, 506 (W.D. Mo. 1938).
116. United States v. Guthrie, 11 F.Supp. 1 (W.D. Tenn. 1935). The physician of
the trial judge testified as to his medical condition.
117. Id. at 3.
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Rule 43 calls for the presence of the defendant at the trial. But
not all cases of absence will necessitate a new trial. No new trial was
held necessary where the court questioned a juror about a meeting of
the wives of the defendant and the juror in the presence of defendant's
counsel, but in the absence of the defendant himself. 18 Where two
defendants are tried together and one of them absents himself after
the trial has commenced, neither is entitled to a new trial as the absent
defendant is estopped and the other defendant should have objected at
once and asked for a continuance.11
Suppose a defendant has been convicted after his plea of double
jeopardy has been wrongly overruled. Is he entitled to a new trial?
It has been held that he is not where he makes no showing of such
jeopardy. 121 Jeopardy is not a ground for a new trial when it is first
raised on motion for a new trial; objection should be made during
the trial.1 2'
In general a motion for a new trial does not lie for denial of a
continuance unless abuse of discretion is shown. 22
Improper denial of a motion for mistrial may be a ground for a
new trial. 2 ' Failure to move for a mistrial may be ground for denial
of a new trial as the defendant may not gamble on a favorable verdict.' 2 4
Where the trial court instructs the jury that they may not find a
verdict as to some of the defendants, and disagree as to the others, a new
trial will be granted. 2 ' It has been suggested in a dissenting opinion
of the Supreme Court that it is improper for the trial court to instruct
the jury as to both murder and manslaughter and then peremptorily tell
them that they cannot convict for manslaughter. 2 6 In a strongly contested case where the government rests its case largely on the testimony
of an informer, there is a ground for a new trial if the trial court ex12 7
presses a strong opinion that the defendant is guilty.
Where the request of the defendant for instructions is not timely,
the refusal is not a ground for a new trial. There is, therefore, no error
118. Lask v. United States, 221 F.2d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1955).

119. United States v. Vassado, 52 F.2d 699 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
120. Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1950).
121. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 399, 405 (8th Cir. 1928). The Supreme Court
has held that a state court need not grant a new trial when jeopardy was first raised on
a motion for new trial. Durein v. Kansas, 208 U.S. 613 (1908), affirming, State v.
Durein, 70 Kan. 1, 78 Pac. 152, 156 (1904).

122. Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224 (1902) ; United States v. Yager, 220
F.2d 795, 796 (7th Cir. 1955).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 283-284 (3d Cir. 1941).
Claunch v. United States, 155 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1946).
Bucklin v. United States, 159 U.S. 682, 686 (1895).
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 110, 177 (1895) (dissenting opinion).
Davis v. United States, 227 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1955).
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in declining to give an instruction filed just before the final argument
by the government, and a few minutes before the case was submitted
to the jury.'2 8
Where the defendant made no request for instructions and no
objection to the charge, and his counsel, at the conclusion of the charge,
repeated an unqualified negative response to a query for suggestions
or objections, he was not permitted to complain on motion for a new
trial that the charge was fatally defective.' 29 But if there had been a
great miscarriage of justice, the trial court could have intervened and
granted a new trial even though no objections to the charge of the
court were made by the defendant."'0
The jury's determination of punishment must be unanimous if the
jury is authorized to decide what sentence to impose, and if the jury is
not properly instructed as to this, a new trial lies.' 3 '
A defendant may not waive his right to a unanimous verdict. If he
does so and is convicted, he is entitled to a new trial. 2 A mistaken
impression by jurors that dissenting jurors must yield to the majority
favoring conviction is not ground for a new trial when the trial judge
instructs the jury that unanimity is required for a verdict but that any
juror is free to observe his own convictions.' 33
Where a deputy marshal in charge of the jury shortly before
verdict informed the jury that they had better hurry up, as the judge
was leaving the city, a new trial was not necessarily required although
34
it was a circumstance to be considered.
There was not such improper coercion of the trial jury by the
court as to warrant a new trial where the judge was unwilling to reread
an instruction on Sunday and the jury requested further opportunity to
deliberate, no objection being made, and then returned a verdict in
forty minutes.' 35 An inquiry by the trial judge whether or not there
is a pronounced majority of the jury in agreement is so coercive as to
warrant a new trial. 3
128. United States v. Thomas, 52 F. Supp. 571, 586 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
129. United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 67 (W.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd. 173 F.2d
223 (3d Cir. 1949).
130. Id. at 67. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946).
131. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
132. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953), 37 A.L.R. 1130 (1954).
133. United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 776 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
134. Kriebel v. United States, 8 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269
U.S. 582 (1926).

135. United States v. Thomas, 52 F. Supp. 571, 588-591 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
136. United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1949), 3
L. Rrv. 123 (1949).
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Inconsistent verdicts as to codefendants charged with conspiracy
are not grounds for a new trial; acquittal of one defendant, whether
erroneous or not, does not require acquittal of other defendants. 3 7
The same is true as to prosecution for consummated crimes. 1 18 Where
one defendant is tried alone, the verdict need not be consistent as to
the various counts of the indictment especially when each count charges
a separate offense. 3 9
A conviction on all of the counts charging separate criminal acts
in a single transaction, is not a ground for a new trial."4 However,
an imperfect verdict or one on which no judgment can be entered is a
ground for a new trial'""
If the error is in the sentence, even though it makes the sentence
void, the proper procedure is not motion for a new trial, but rather
for a resentencing of the defendant. 4 2 In a conspiracy case sentencing
of those codefendants who pleaded guilty in the presence of the jury
may be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.'4
In some cases the death of the court reporter may be a ground for
a new trial.'

44

Surprise has not been a frequent ground for a new trial. Most
of the cases in which it is an issue find no surprise present sufficient to
warrant a new trial.' 41 In one case a new trial was granted because
the trial court was satisfied that the testimony given by a material
witness was false and probably affected the verdict and that the defendant was surprised, unable to meet it, and did not learn of the falsity
137. Nadi v. United States, 6 F.2d 574 (7th Cir,), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 574
(1925). More than two conspirators were involved; see also United States v. Thomas,
52 F. Supp. 571, 579 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
138. United States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27, 30 (D.N.J. 1954).
139. United States v. Frank, 4 F. Supp. 372, 374 (W.D. Pa. 1933) ; see Dunn v.
United States, 248 U.S. 390 (1932); Bickel, Judge and Jury-Inconsistent Verdicts in
the Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. Rgv. 649 (1950).
140. Orth v. United States, 252 Fed. 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1918) ; United States v.
Harrell, 65 Fed. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1895) ; United States v. Dickinson, 25 Fed. Cas. 850,
No. 14958 (C.C.D. Ohio 1840).
141. O'Connell v. United States, 235 U.S. 142 (1920) ; United States v. Bruzzo,
85 U.S. 125 (1873).
142. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
906 (1949).
143. Minker v. United States, 85 F.2d 425, 427 (3d Cir. 1936), reversing, 12 F.
Supp. 783 (M.D. Pa. 1935).
144. Dowling v. United States, 22 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1927), rehearing denied, 23
F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1928). On the facts a new trial was denied as there was an adequate
substitute.
145. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 691 (6th Cir. 1941) (evidence was
within the pleadings) ; United States v. Noble, 294 Fed. 689 (D. Mont. 1923), aff'd,
300 Fed. 689 (9th Cir. 1924) (defendant failed to move for mistrial); Bates v.
United States, 269 Fed. 563 (6th Cir. 1920) (no objection taken during trial).
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until after the trial.'46 A defendant does not make out surprise when
14 7
he fails to exercise due diligence to refute false testimony at the trial.
(g). Rulings on Evidence. This is a frequent ground of motion for
a new trial, particularly in cases tried by jury. The modern trend is to
hold that where much evidence is taken covering a wide range of inquiry, a new trial will not be granted for technical errors in the admission of evidence not affecting matters of substance.
Violation of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
may be a ground for a new trial. The defendant has the right not to
testify at the trial. Hence, it was ground for a new trial that the trial
court had admitted evidence to the effect that the defendant was given
a chance, after his arrest, to explain the presence of marijuana on his
premises and that he did not do so.'4 8
It has been held that it is not necessarily reversible error that a
149
trial court heard evidence of a confession in the presence of the jury.
Nevertheless, it is better practice to hear evidence on the admissibility
of other evidence out of the presence of the jury, and a new trial may be
granted where this is not done. 5 °
A refusal of the trial court to permit the jury to take notes of the
testimony and its requiring them to surrender up those previously taken
was not ground for a new trial.'
One judge has suggested that only
in exceptional cases should a juror be stopped by the court from taking
notes on his own volition, or the request of the jury to take notes be
denied.' 5 2
The exclusion of the testimony of a witness who disregards the
rule excluding him from the courtroom except when he is testifying
is not necessarily a ground for a new trial.'5 3 Further, failure to
sequester the witnesses is not a ground if there is no prejudice, par54
ticularly if the defendant fails to ask for it.'
Where the principal witness for the Government testifies for eight
days both as an expert witness and as a factual witness, and the expert
146. United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd. on other
grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946) ; see also United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128, 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
147. United States v. Flynn, 131 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), 104 U. PA. L.

REv. 435.

148. Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1955).
149. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910).
150. Eierman v. United States, 46 F.2d 46, 49 (10th Cir. 1930).
151. United States v. Davis, 103 Fed. 457, 470 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1900).
152. United States v. Campbell, 138 F. Supp. 344, 348 (N.D. Iowa 1956), citing
many cases and comments.
153. United States v. Mooney, 269 Fed. 853 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
154. Witt v. United States, 196 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1952); Kaufman v. United
States, 163 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 1947).
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testimony is finally stricken as incompetent, this is so confusing to the
jury as to warrant a new trial. 55
The arrest of a witness in the presence of the jury is not a ground
for a new trial when the defendant did not object at the time." 6
A trial judge's excessive interjection into the examination of witnesses and his numerous comments to defense counsel sometimes
indicating hostility, though under provocation, may indicate such bias
and lack of impartiality as to warrant a new trial.' 7
Improper cross-examination by the Government of a defendant may
be ground for a new trial. It was so held where the purpose of the
cross-examination was to create the impression that the defendant was
linked to a county political leader in a vast criminal scheme.' 5"
It is ground for a new trial that a defendant who took the stand
was cross-examined as to convictions other than for felonies or crimes
involving moral turptitude. 59 It has been held that, if error, it was
harmless error for a district trial court sitting without a jury to permit
the prosecution to question the defendant on cross-examination as to a
former conviction over objection of defendant's counsel. 6 ° In general,
"absent a requirement of showing system or intent, evidence of offenses
not charged in the indictment is not only inadmissible, but prejudicial
if admitted," 161 and warrants a new trial. The evidence should be
stricken from the record and the jury instructed to disregard it.
Sometimes, such an instruction will not cure the error, and a mistrial
must be granted.
In a homicide prosecution in which the defendant pleaded selfdefense, discovery of evidence that after the homicide an open penknife
was found in the trouser pocket in which the victim had his hand,
because it was known to the prosecution but not disclosed to the defendant during trial, was held ground for a new trial. 16 2

Evidence of un-

communicated threats was admissible as bearing on the question of
the victim's conduct.
155. United States v. O'Malley, 117 F. Supp. 895, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
156. Powell v. United States, 35 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1929).
157. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (The court
was divided two to one) ; see also Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685 (9th Cir.

1937).

158. United States v. Perlstein, 120 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1941).
159. Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 405-406 (6th Cir. 1953). Crossexamination was as to defendant's army court-martial record.
160. United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.) cert. denied,
337 U.S. 959 (1949).
161. Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1955) ; see MCCORMICK,

326-333 (1954).
162. Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see
EviDENcE 573-574 (1954).

EVIDENcE
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When the defendant's counsel was asked if he had any objections
to certain testimony and counsel replied in the negative, defendant was
not entitled to a new trial on the ground that such testimony was
Where the question is proper, but the answer is hearsay the
hearsay."
defendant should normally object at once. However, when, after a few
more questions, the defendant's counsel renewed his objection to the
question, and, in a prior side-bar discussion had informed the court that
64
the answer was objectionable as hearsay, a new trial was granted.
A refusal to receive into evidence a dying declaration may be
ground for a new trial. 5
It has been held that a conviction based on the uncorroborated
trial
testimony of persons convicted of crime is not a basis for a 1new
66
unjust.
is
conviction
the
court
the
of
unless in the judgment
If the Government in its argument to the jury protests that the

defendant failed to offer evidence of good reputation, this may be a
ground for a new trial. 16 7 But, the court may cure the error by instructing the jury that the presumption is that the reputation of the
defendant is good. 68 Therefore, remarks of the Government in the
argument to the jury concerning the absence of character evidence
was not a ground for a new trial, where the court in its charge to the
jury went to great length to explain that there was a presumption that
the reputation of the defendant was good, and that the jury was obliged
to accept the presumption as proof. 69 Comment by the prosecution
on the failure of the defendant to take the stand is a ground for a new
trial.170 However, mere jury deliberation on the failure of the defend17 1
ant to take the stand is not a ground. '

In a kidnapping prosecution where fingerprinting cards were
identified and offered solely as fingerprints, and defendant's counsel
and the trial judge were ignorant of the existence of the defendant's
criminal history on the reverse side of the cards until after the jury
72
had returned a verdict, the defendant was entitled to a new trial.'
163. United States v. Hack, 205 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1953).
164. United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
165. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
166. United States v. Knoell, 230 Fed. 509, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1916).
167. Pierce v. United States, 86 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1936) ; Lowdon v. United
States, 149 Fed. 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1906) ; McKnight v. United States, 97 Fed. 208, 209
(6th Cir. 1899) ; Note, 54 COLUM. L. Rixv. 946, 953 (1954).
168. Dale v. United States, 66 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1933); United States v.
Bonner, 21 F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
169. United States v. Bonner, 21 F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1937). In this case counsel
for defendant objected at once and asked for a mistrial.
170. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893).
171. Davis v. United States, 47 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1931).
172. United States v. Dressier, 112 F. 2d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1940).
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Prejudice will be presumed. Similarly, where the jury took to the
jury room two indictments on which the defendant had been convicted
in a former trial, containing notations of former convictions, a new
trial was granted. 7 '
A claim that venue has not been sufficiently proven should not be
174
raised for the first time on motion for a new trial.
In general, insufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised for the
first time by motion for a new trial. The defendant instead should
object by motion for judgment of acquittal under rule 29 or by objection to the instructions to the jury. 175 It was early held that insufficiency of the evidence is a ground for a new trial and that the
defendant when tried again cannot complain that he has been in
7
jeopardy because of such insufficiency. 1
What are the tests of sufficiency of the evidence? Over the years
the test seems to have grown more favorable to the defendant as the
ensuing cases, listed chronologically, reveal. It was early stated that
the trial court will grant a new trial if the verdict is clearly against the
evidence, that more latitude is allowed in criminal cases than in civil,
and that the court should be well satisfied of the insufficiency of the
evidence to convince the jury of the correctness of the verdict. 7 7 The
Supreme Court stated that it is 'discretionary to grant a new trial on
the ground that the verdict is against the evidence, and that it would
not review the issue whether the verdict is contrary to the weight of
the evidence if there was any evidence proper to go to the jury to
support the verdict.. 78 The jurors are the exclusive judges of what
was proved, and the trial judge will not set aside a verdict because he
79
differs as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
One court has said that it is not the trial judge's legal duty to grant
a new trial when he is not himself satisfied that the evidence establishes
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 ° He may deny a new trial unless
173. Ogden v. United States, 112 Fed. 523, 526 (3d Cir. 1902). But, if there is
knowledge, the objection should be raised at the trial. Holmgren v. United States, 217
U.S. 509, 520 (1910) ; United States v. Knopfer, 12 F. Supp. 980, 981 (M.D. Pa. 1935).
174. Turner v. United States, 259 Fed. 103 (6th Cir. 1919).
175. Utley v. United States, 5 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Lockhart v. United States,
264 Fed. 14, 16 (6th Cir. 1920). But see Edwards v. United States, 7 F.2d 357, 359
(9th Cir. 1925) suggesting that the trial court should consider this, though not the
court of appeals. See also Orfield, Motion for Acquittal in Federal Criminal Procedure:
Successor to Directed Verdict, 28

TEMP.

L.Q. 400, 419 (1955).

176. United States v. Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15510, at 690 (C.C.D. Ind. 1839).
177. United States v. Daubner, 17 Fed. 793, 807 (E.D. Wis. 1883).
178. Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891). It may not be assigned as
error that the verdict is against the evidence according to Moore v. United States, 150
U.S. 57,62 (1893).
179. United States v. Ducourneau, 54 Fed. 138, 139 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1891).
180. Bain v. United States, 262 Fed. 664, 666 (6th Cir. 1920).
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he is convinced that reasonable men could not have considered that the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His duty is not
different from that of an appellate court. However, in his discretion he
may grant a new trial if he thinks that the evidence lacks that degree
of persuasiveness without which there should be no conviction. If, for
example, the defendant has been tried and convicted twice before the
same judge and on the same evidence, he need not grant a new trial.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has gone even further
in protecting the defendant. It has held that the trial judge as well
as the jurors should attentively consider and weigh the evidence as it
is introduced "because in that respect he is sitting as the thirteenth
juror." "'s
And it is the exclusive and unassignable function of the
trial judge to grant or refuse a new trial in cases of conflicting evidence.
It has been said that since a motion for a new trial on the ground
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to
the court's discretion and it cannot be error to overrule it, the trial
court should consider it "with especial conscientiousness." 182 The
trial court may grant a new trial although the evidence is conflicting.'8 3
One trial judge stated: "From these eminent authorities I concede
it to be my duty to grant a new trial unless I am satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the verdict is justified under the evidence." 184
The Supreme Court has held that the verdict must be sustained if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to sustain it.' 8 5

One of the fullest statements by a trial court of how the trial court
should consider the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a new
trial after a conviction by a jury is by Judge John W. Murphy:
"In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
verdict of the jury, this court must take that view of the evidence
which is most favorable to the Government; must give the Government the benefit of all the inferences which reasonably may be
drawn from the evidence; and must refrain from concerning itself
with the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
The verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support it." 186
One judge has stated that it is "the right and duty of the court
to grant a new trial in the event that the court feels that the verdict is
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Applebaum v. United States, 274 Fed. 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1921).
United States v. Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Mo. 1938).
United States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1939).
United States v. Kaadt, 31 Supp. 546, 547 (N.D. Ind. 1940).
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 77 (1942).
United States v. Sorrentino, 78 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Pa. 1948).
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against the evidence." 187 On motion for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the court may weigh
the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses.1 88 The
power is broader than on motion for judgment of acquittal. 189 But it
"should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict." ' The distinction is fair
for the defendant does not go free but is subject to another trial. It is
not a ground for a new trial that the verdict is contrary to the opinion
of an expert psychiatrist, so long as the verdict does not shock the
conscience of the court.'
It will thus appear from the precedents just
considered that a trial judge may find ample precedent when he denies
the motion for insufficiency of the evidence and much precedent when
he grants it.
(h). Newly Discovered Evidence. It was quite common at least in
the earlier cases to say that new trials on the ground of newly discovered evidence "are not favored." 192
Federal District Judge Chesnut has quoted ' with approval the
views of a leading text on federal procedure as to the sufficiency of
newly discovered evidence:
"A motion based on newly discovered evidence must disclose
(1) that the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) that the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) that it will
probably produce an acquittal; and (4) that failure to learn of
the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the
defendant."

194

When, after conviction, one of several joint defendants recants
testimony tending to connect another with the crime, his recantation
187.United States v. Thomas, 52 F. Supp. 571, 580 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
188. United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1947).
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id. at 10-11. The case is followed in United States v. Beacon Musical Instruments Co., 135 F. Supp. 220, 222 (D. Mass. 1955) ; United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp.
217, 220 (D.D.C. 1954) ; United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 622 (D. Hawaii
1949).
191. United States v. Gundelfinger, 102 F. Supp. 177, 179 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
192.'Casey v. United States, 20 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1927). In 1954 a court

still took the view that such motion "is looked upon with disfavor and distrust." Nilva

v. United States, 212 F.2d 115, 124 (8th Cir. 1954) ; see also United States v. Hiss,
107 F. Supp. 128, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

193. United States v. Frankfeld, 111 F. Supp. 919, 922 (D. Md. 1953); see also
United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
194. 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2282 (1951).

Earlier cases

such as Johnson v. United States, 32 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1929) quoted similar language from 12 Cyc. 734. The latter decision is still quoted in recent cases. United
States v. Rutkin 208 F.2d 647, 649 (3d Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Berkshire Fabricators Co., 17 F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.R.I. 1955).
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may be the ground for a new trial of the defendant affected by that
testimony.1" 5 The Seventh Circuit has laid down a separate rule as to
newly discovered evidence where there has been a recantation or
where it has been proved that false testimony was given at the trial.1 96
Under this rule a new trial lies where (a) the court is reasonably well
satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false, (b)
that without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion,
and (c) that the defendant was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its
falsity until after the trial.
The defendant is not entitled to a new trial when a witness for .the
Government repudiates his testimony and then recants his repudiation. 11 7 Recantation by the government's main prosecuting witness is
not necessarily a ground for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.198 But, where an important witness for the prosecution makes an affidavit of mistake as to a material issue, a new trial
will be granted.199 A recantation of a signed statement made by an
affiant before trial is not a basis for a new trial when the affiant does
not testify at the trial. 2
An evasive and uncertain recantation by a,
government witness is not a ground for a new trial.2 ° ' In a recent case
involving the witness, Harvey Matusow, the court ruled that his recantation was false, hence no new trial was granted.2 °2 If the defendant would probably be acquitted without the testimony of a codefendant
who was convicted of perjury, and the codefendant's statements to the
FBI contradicted his testimony, a new trial should be granted.20 3
A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence will be
granted where a conviction is obtained by the use of evidence poisoned
and tainted with wire tapping." 4 Further, new trial as well as habeas
195. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925).
196. United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1944); Larrison v.
United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928) ; see United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp.
128, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The Larrison case is said to have been without authority
in 39 MINN. L. RZv. 316, 317 (1955).
197. United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954), 39 MINN. L. Rev.
316 (1955) ; Blodgett v. United States, 161 F.2d 47, 55 (8th Cir. 1947).
198. Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1951). The court cited
United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946).
199. United States v. Radford, 131 Fed. 378 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1904).
200. United States v. On Lee, 201 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1953). There had been fifteen
prior convictions of the affiant.
201. Nilva v. United States, 212 F.2d 115, 123 (8th Cir. 1954).
202. Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1955).
203. United States v. Miller, 61 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); for a general
statement that perjury is a ground see Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th
Cir. 1927). On perjured evidence as a want of due process see Note, 5 UTAH L. Rxv.
92, 96 (1956).
204. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); United States v. Coplon, 91
F. Supp. 867, 869 (D.D.C. 1950).
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corpus and writ of error coram nobis should be available where the
prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant. °5
Newly discovered evidence that a prosecution witness had a
criminal record is usually treated as merely cumulative.2" 6 This is
doubly true if the testimony of the witness at the trial was itself merely
cumulative. °7 A highly unusual ground for a new trial for newly
discovered evidence arises when, after the defendant's conviction, a
material witness, without whose testimony he could not have been
convicted, is indicted and convicted of a crime committed before the
trial. If this could have been shown at the trial it would have tended
greatly to discredit his testimony. 2°1 Suppose the government witness
cannot be cross-examined by the defendant as to a conviction of a crime
in a state court because the appeal of the conviction has not been
determined. When such conviction of the witness has been affirmed on
appeal, the defendant may have a new trial and show such conviction.20 9
On the issue-of due diligence a defendant secured a reversal of a
denial of a new trial by the trial judge under the following circumstances: Counsel for defendant prior to trial had gone to the police
station three times to learn the identity of the officer who had accompanied the complaining witness to a card game at which the witness had
been robbed. No record of the incident could be found. Defendant
went to the precinct at a change of shifts in an unsuccessful attempt to
identify the officer. The testimony of the police officer would have
contradicted the testimony of the witness on critical issues. 10 Where
a disinterested witness, who was not available to testify at the trial
through no fault of the defendant or his counsel, later becomes available
and can supply evidence of vital importance which was not available at
the trial except on the testimony of the defendant himself, a new trial
should be granted.2 '
Suppose the newly discovered evidence is an affidavit of another
that he had committed the crime. If this affidavit is not contested by
205. In United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954), there was a disregard of keenly pertinent evidence but the court held that the evidence must be knowingly suppressed; see Note, Suppressed and Perjured Evidence: a Denial of Due Process, 5 UTAH L. Rrv. 92 (1956).
206. Meyers v. United States, 207 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1953); Murphy v. United
States, 198 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (juvenile court record).
207. Laurence v. United States, 196 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
981 (1952).
208. United States v. Senft, 274 Fed. 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1921). The defendant was
charged with bribing the witness who was later convicted of extortion.
209. United States v. Segelman, 83 F. Supp. 890, 893 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
210. Coates v. United States, 174 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The decision was
two to one.
211. Amos v. United States, 218 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court did not regard such evidence as merely cumulative. The witness was a prisoner in a workhouse.
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the Government it should afford a basis for a new trial. But, if the
evidence clearly shows that the defendant committed the crime, no new
trial will be granted.212
Evidence showing nothing more than flimsy cumulative support of
an alibi upon which defendant relied at the trial and which could not
have affected the result in view of the positive, identification of the
defendant is not sufficient to support a motion for a new trial for newly
discovered evidence. 13 Also, if the newly discovered evidence is merely
hearsay, no new trial need be granted.214 Where the newly discovered
evidence, in a case under the Smith Act, merely showed the amount
which the government's informant had received as salary while seeking
information against the defendant, and that another witness had been
convicted of drunkenness, no new trial was granted. 15 Acquittal of a
codefendant is not newly discovered evidence."' 6 Newly discovered
evidence of an attempt to bribe a member of the trial jury is a basis for
217

a new trial.

In determining the kind and quality of newly discovered evidence
which will warrant a new trial, the federal courts are not bound by the
decisions of the state courts in the state where the trial took place
though such decisions may be more favorable to the defendant.21 '
It has been pointed out that the stenographer's minutes of the
trial are preserved so that the defendant can establish the materiality
of, or reliance on, newly discovered evidence by comparing such evidence
with the record.2 19
IV.
TIME.

An early case held that a motion for a new trial would not lie if
2 19
made after a motion in arrest had been made and passed upon. a
212. Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1954). The court pointed out
that if a new trial were granted, then the affiant could claim self-incrimination and not
testify, hence there would be no evidence to present to the court. It would seem harsh,
however, to deny a new trial solely on that ground; see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1476

(3d ed. 1940).

213. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
916 (1949).
214. Wagner v. United States, 118 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1941); Boyd v. United
States, 30 F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1929).
215. United States v. Frankfeld, 111 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1953), aff'd, 207 F.2d
413 (4th Cir. 1953).
216. Lander v. United States, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 8039, at 1065 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844).
217. Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1947).
218. United States v. Rutkin, 208 F.2d 647, 654 (3d Cir. 1953). But, Kalodner,
J., dissenting, relied on state court decisions of various states. Id. at 657.

219.
CgDURE

NEw YORK UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES OP CRIMINAL PRO-

230-231 (1946).

219a. United States v. Simmons, 27 Fed. Cas. 1080, No. 16291 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1878). In this case a motion made three years after trial was held too late.
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But, such is not the modern view. Today, the motion may be made
before, simultaneously with, or after a motion in arrest. Where the
statutes are silent, it has been held that the courts should apply the
common-law rule, and hence the motion for a new trial must be made
within the same term. 22 0 In 1914 the Supreme Court adopted this
rule.2 2' If the motion is made within the term it can be passed upon
later. The consent of the Government cannot confer jurisdiction, and
the court of appeals can issue a writ of prohibition against trial of the
case.
The Criminal Appeals Rules of 1934 provided a three-day period
in which to move for a new trial and sixty days for newly discovered
evidence. 22 The motion was to be "determined promptly." However,
the time fixed was too short and the motions were not necessarily
determined promptly. 223 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 33,
removed some of these defects by allowing five days for the ordinary
motion. Under rule 33 a motion for a new trial made seven days after
verdict is timely when the seven days includes both a Sunday and a
state holiday.2 .
The motion for a new trial may be made after judgment.22 ' At
common law such a motion was not a part of the record. In fact, there
was doubt whether it could be included in a bill of exceptions since it
occurred after verdict or after judgment. However, a less technical
rule has been applied in the federal courts and there the motion may
226
be incorporated into a bill of exceptions.
The language of the last sentence of rule 33 providing that a
motion for a new trial shall be made within five days of "finding of
guilty" covers a finding of the trial judge that the defendant is guilty
as charged, made and entered in the minutes of the court, and not the
subsequent date when sentence is imposed. 227 The argument that
the trial court might change its mind before entering judgment is not
220. Trafton v. United States, 147 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1906).
221. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914), 28 HARV. L. Rnv. 412 (1915).
222. For cases construing the rule see Orfield, The Federal Criminal Appeals Rules
as Interpreted in the Decisions, 21 N.C.L. REv. 28, 35-39 (1942).
223. Orfield, Improving Procedure On Judgment and Appeal in Federal Criminal
cases, 2 F.R.D. 573, 576-578 (1943).
224. United States v. Simon, 225 F.2d 260, 262, 263 (3d Cir. 1955).
225. A new trial may be granted even though the defendant has been sentenced
and the sentence was to take effect immediately. Cisser v. United States, 37 F.2d 330
(4th Cir. 1930). The defendant had not entered the penitentiary, nor had he been turned
over to the executive department. It was held that the motion lay even though the
defendant had entered upon service of sentence. United States v. Guthrie, 11 F. Supp.
1, 2 (W.D. Tenn. 1935).
226. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925). This case is approved by Justice Brandeis in the Court's opinion in Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub
Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 482 (1933).
227. Pugh v. United States, 197 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1952).
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acceptable. The finding of the court is treated exactly like a verdict
of guilty by a jury. Form 25 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shows that the making of the finding of guilt is an action of the
court preceding and apart from the judgment.
The period fixed in rule 33 for motion for a new trial is jurisdictional.22 Even though the trial court entertains and passes on an untimely motion, this does not extend the time limit, since rule 45(b)
forbids enlargement of time for filing motions for new trials. The
time to move for a new trial may not be extended by a supplemental
motion made after the time fixed in rule 33 has expired. Hence, a
supplemental motion filed after an appealed denial of the original motion
for a new trial and more than two years after conviction was affirmed
is properly denied as untimely. 2 9
The time for motion for a new trial is not extended merely because
a void sentence is imposed after a fair trial.2 " Further, the time for
newly discovered evidence can not be applied. But, a district court has
held that when a void sentence is imposed on the defendant, the time
for motion for a new trial does not start to run, for the entire proceedings are then suspended. However, when a correct sentence is later
imposed, the time then starts to run even though a period of as much
as eight years may have intervened.2 '
The motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence must
be made "within two years after final judgment." What is meant by
"final judgment"? Does this mean the date when judgment of conviction and sentence was entered, or does it mean the subsequent date
of mandate of affirmance by the court of appeals? In United States v.
Hiss, the court found it unnecessary to decide this issue as the motion
was made within two years of both, being one day within the former
limit.232 In another case the court clearly held that "final judgment"
includes the mandate of affirmance.2 33
228. Lujan v. United States, 204 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Drown v. United
States, 198 F.2d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 920 (1953) ; Marion
v. United States, 171 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944 (1949).
229. Oddo v. United States, 171 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
943 (1949). Defendant argued that his motion was in reality a motion to reargue the
motion for new trial previously denied. The court did not pass on this contention but
charitably treated the supplemental motion as a motion for new trial.
230. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906
(1949). Here the sentence was alleged to be- void because counsel for defendant was
not present when sentence was pronounced. The motion was made more than seven
years after conviction.
231. United States v. Wilfong, 95 F. Supp. 897, 899 (W.D. Mich. 1951). A defendant who makes such a delayed motion for new trial is estopped from denying the
jurisdiction of the trial court on a subsequent motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1952).
232. 107 F. Sup. 128, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), ouff'd. 201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1953).
233. Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1951). However, the
motion seems to have been made within two years after verdict of guilty.
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The hardship of the two-year limitation on newly discovered
evidence is shown in a case in which the evidence, discovered about
twelve years after trial, established that the defendant was innocent
and had been the victim of mistaken identity.234 The only relief possible
was a pardon. The motion procedure under 28 U.S.C. section 2255
and coram nobis would not lie.2"'
It may sometimes be to the distinct advantage of a defendant to
move for a new trial within the five-day period even though the ground
is something like newly discovered evidence.

Such early motion "is

broader in scope than the limitations which have been held applicable
where the motion is based on newly discovered evidence." Thus,
where the defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a
twelve year old girl, and four days after a verdict of guilty, defendant
introduced an affidavit of the girl's mother, who had not testified at
the trial, and who had seen and talked with the girl shortly after the
alleged offense, contradicting the testimony of the girl in two respects
and giving the mother's opinion that nothing had happened to the girl,
the trial court erred in denying the motion.2 6
Suppose the trial judge has acted timely in denying or granting a
motion for a new trial. May he, at a much later time, reconsider his
action, and thus extend the time for granting or denying a motion for
a new trial? The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
this could be done validly, and concluded that this was the weight of
authority as to state court decisions." 7 However, the Supreme Court
disagreed." 5 On the other hand, if the court reconsiders its denial of
the motion within a reasonable time and there is no appeal taken, the
court may grant the motion.239
After a judgment of conviction has been affirmed by the court
of appeals upon an appeal in which the district court's denial of a
motion for a new trial was one of the errors assigned, and the defendant
has commenced serving his sentence, a federal district court has no
234. United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

235. Id. at 11-13. For criticism of this case see Donnelly, Uncon-victing the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. REv. 20 (1952); Note 36 MINN. L. Riw. 533 (1952) ; see Orfield,
Amending the Federal Rules of Crinhinal Procedure, 24 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 315, 327330 (1949). There is no time limit in Michigan. Whalen v. Frisbie, 185 F.2d 607, 608
(6th Cir. 1950). In Nebraska the time limit has been increased by statute to three years.
19 NEB. L. B. 152 (1940). See the criticism made forty years ago by Williston, Does
a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? 28 HARV. L. REV. 647, 659 (1945).
236. Benton v. United States, 188 F.2d 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
237. United States v. Smith, 156 F.2d 642, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1946).
238. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947).
239. See the dissenting opinion of Biggs, J., in United States v. Smith, 156 F.2d
642, 646, 647, n. 5 (3d Cir. 1946).
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power under rule 33 to order a new trial on its own motion.24 ° Hence,
the prosecution is entitled to mandamus and prohibition from the court
of appeals to compel the vacating of an order granting a new trial. The
rule deprives the judge of power to grant such a motion on request of
the defendant, hence it would be anomalous to allow the judge to act
on his own initiative. For the judge to act on his own motion would
raise serious questions of double jeopardy,2 4' whereas, when the
motion is granted on motion of the defendant, the question of jeopardy
is obviated. Even when no appeal is taken the power of the court to
act on its own motion does not exist indefinitely. 4 ' Clearly the trial
court may take "time for reflection." 24' "It is in the interest of justice
that a decision on the propriety of a trial be reached as soon after it has
ended as possible, and that a decision be not deferred until the trial's
story has taken on the uncertainty and dimness of things long past." 244
V.
AFFIDAVITS.

Rule 33 does not speak of the necessity of affidavits in support of
a motion for a new trial.245 Under rule 47 a motion "may be supported
by affidavit." The rule does not say that it must be supported by
affidavit.
Where the evidence presented on the motion for a new trial consists of affidavits, the court may deny the motion on the basis of counter
affidavits.2"' An affidavit stating a mere conclusion will not support a
240. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947), reversing 156 F.2d 642 (3d Cir.
1946), 60 HARV. L. REV. 145 (1947), 46 MICH. L. REV. 690 (1948), 95 U. PA. L. REV.
414 (1947), 22 WASH. L. REV. 57 (1947) ; see also Casebeer v. Hudspeth, 121 F.2d 914
(10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 883 (1942) ; Orfield, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 503-504 (1947).

241. The Court stated that it was not necessary to decide whether retrial on the
court's own motion would be jeopardy. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 474-75 (1947).
242. United States v. Smith, 156 F'2d 642, 647 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1946) (dissenting
opinion). Biggs, J. stated that "no appeal being taken, a trial judge might reconsider
a motion for a new trial filed by a convicted defendant and grant it after the defendant had served, let us say, three years of a five-year sentence. Under such circumstances it might be necessary to hold that the service of the motion was spent after
the lapse of a reasonable time ....
" In the same case, in the Supreme Court, Justice
Jackson stated that it is not acceptable "that the power of the trial court to grant new
trials on its own motion lingers on indefinitely." 331 U.S. 469, 473 (1947). Prior to the
rules a new trial could be granted only during the same term. This is now altered by
rule 45 (c). Presumably the Supreme Court would also say that the power of the trial
court to grant a new trial on the defendant's motion does not linger on indefinitely.
243. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).
244. Id. at 476.
245. See Note, 37 IOWA L. REV.. 399 (1952). Affidavits have been used in the federal courts because they are widely used in the state courts. NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 244-45 (1946).
246. Glenberg v. United States, 281 Fed. 816 (6th Cir. 1922). In Blodgett v.
United States, 161 F.2d 47, 56 (8th Cir. 1947), the court pointed out that virtually all
state court decisions held that the trial court will not be reversed where there are
counter affidavits.
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motion for a new trial.247 Where the motion is on the ground of newly
discovered evidence the affidavit must show the relation of the new
evidence to the evidence presented at the trial. 48
Suppose the affidavit in support of the motion for a new trial is
ambiguous. It has been said that where the motion is on the ground
of newly discovered evidence the ambiguity should not be resolved in
favor of the Government without inquiry of the proposed witness,
especially where the sole evidence at the trial is the word of the arresting officer and the Government could have, but refused to offer
corroborating evidence.249 Vague and indefinite affidavits are likely
to result in a denial of a new trial even though they are received by the
court. ° Where the affidavit offered by the defendant in support of
his motion was signed by a young witness while in another state where
it was presented to him, and pressure was brought to bear upon him
to sign such affidavit, but which was contradicted by a second affidavit,
the motion was properly denied as such an affidavit failed to show
2
perjury. 51
May the affidavits supporting the motion for a new trial come from
members of the jury which convicted the defendant? Frequent statements are made that they may not.Y2 For example, it has been held
that a verdict of first-degree murder could not be impeached by
affidavits of two jurors that they would not have joined in the verdict
had they known that it called for life imprisonment. 2 3 Affidavits of
jurors supporting' charges of misconduct showing the method of arriving at the verdict are also incompetent. 54 Affidavits or testimony of
jurors cannot be received to show, for the prosecution or the defendant,
that the jurors did or did not consider documentary or other information which was made available to them in the jury room as part of
25 1
the record exhibits in the regular course of the trial proceedings.
247. Camp v. United States, 16 F.2d 370, 371 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274
U.S. 754 (1927).
248. McConnell v. United States, 26 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1928).
249. Hamilton v. United States, 140 F.2d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The case is

cited favorably in United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 43 (9th Cir. 1945).
250. Fullerton v. United States, 8 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1925).
251. Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1927).

252. But the Supreme Court early stated that no general rule could be laid down.
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366 (1851) ; see 56 COLum. L. Rzv. 952

(1956).
253. United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D. Hawaii 1949) ; see also
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 91 (1911) where the jurors thought the penalty
was two years instead of life imprisonment.
254. Lancaster v. United States, 39 F.2d.30, 33 (5th Cir. 1930). It was alleged
that a majority of the jury misrepresented the effect of a verdict to the minority. An
early case held that jurors may not testify as to what they said to each other in their
deliberations. United States v. Daubner, 17 Fed. 793, 802 (E.D. Wis. 1883).
255. United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1949).
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Affidavits or testimony of jurors may be used to show that extraneous
matters or influences, such as tampering with the jury, have been introduced into the courtroom.2 56 But, a recent case held that affidavits of
jurors that they had been influenced by an unauthorized statement of a
bailiff that a verdict must be reached were inadmissible.2 57 The practice
of interviewing jurors after trial as to their state of mind during trial is
to be disapproved.258 Jurors will not be heard "for the purpose of impeaching the verdict returned where the facts sought to be shown are
such that they essentially inhere in the verdict." 25 A verdict supported
by the evidence cannot be upset by inquiry as to whether it was the result
of compromise or mistake.2" An affidavit by a juror that he has been
coerced by other jurors will be received only with great caution. 26Where affidavits are permitted they may be used in support of the motion
2
for a new trial, 2 2 or in opposition to it. 6

The trial judge may decide the motion for a new trial on affidavits
without the calling of witnesses. 2 " In a case involving newly discovered evidence the court of appeals suggested that the trial court "did
the right thing in granting a hearing and seeing the witnesses." 26
It has been suggested that new trials based solely on affidavits
are not favored. A court of appeals has pointed out: "The affidavits
were ex parte, the affiants were not brought into court where they
might have been subject to cross-examination, and where the court
might have had an opportunity to observe their manner and demeanor." 266
In the absence of a stipulation by the Government that affidavits
alleging the improper constitution of a jury may be accepted as proof
in support of a motion for a new trial, it is incumbent on the defendant
256. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) ; Steiner v. United States, 229
F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972, 979 (7th Cir.
1940) ; Chambers v. United States, 237 Fed. 513, 520 (8th Cir. 1916); see Note, 54
MicH. L. Rrv. 1003 (1956).
257. United States v. Brown, 99 F. Supp. 527, 528 (D. Alaska 1951), aff'd. 201
F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1953).
258. United States v. Nystrom, 116 F. Supp. 771, 777 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
259. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 383 (1911) ; Armstrong v. United
States, 228 F.2d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 1956); Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745
(4th Cir. 1948) ; Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187, 188 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Jordon
v. United States, 87 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
260. Dunn v. United Sates, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932) ; see Jorgensen v. York Ice
Machinery Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947), 47 CoLuM. L. Rev. 1373.
261. Crenshaw v. United States, 116 F.2d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1940).
262. Casey v. United States, 20 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1927).
263. Albiza v. United States, 88 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1937).
264. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946) ; United States v. Troche, 213
F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954).
265. United States v. Willis, 217 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1955).
266. Martin v. United States, 154 F.2d 269, 270 (6th Cir. 1946).
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to introduce, or to offer, distinct evidence in support of the motion,

since the formal affidavit alone, even though uncontradicted, is not
enough.2 67
Where the affiants make false affidavits and the defendant urges
them to do so, the affiants may be indicted for perjury and the defendant for subornation of perjury.268
VI.
HEARING

AND

DETERMINATION

OF MOTION.

Is the motion for a new trial a new proceeding, separate from what

has gone on before? The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has stated that it "is a part of the original proceeding, as is
the district court's ruling thereon." 269 At common law the motion
for a new trial and the order following it were not a part of the
record.o
Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "A
motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing
unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state the grounds
upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought.
It may be supported by affidavit." Thus, the motion for a new trial
may be made orally and it should state the grounds for the motion.
Rule 33 does not speak of "filing" the motion for a new trial.
Speaking of the corresponding Criminal Appeals Rule 11(3) one
court has stated that the motion
"may, within the time allowed by the Rules, be filed as of right
without sanction by the judge, and it then becomes his duty to
pass upon it. If the clerk improperly refuses to file it, the judge
can no doubt compel him to file it, or may entertain the motion
without filing. But the movant has no right, the court not being
in session, to present such a motion to the judge without filing,
or to compel the judge to file it for him with the clerk." 271
Mandamus cannot be used to compel the district court to file the motion
for a new trial, as filing is unnecessary, and if it were necessary the clerk
should file it.
267. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 87 (1942) ; Blodgett v. United States,
161 F.2d 47, 56, n. 4 (8th Cir. 1947).
268. Abbott v. Brown, 241 U.S. 606, 608 (1916).
269. Bruno v. United States, 180 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950). But in the first
case passed upon by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the motion
for new trial "is not a part of the proceedings in the cause." United States v. Daniel,
19 U.S. 542, 548 (1821).
270. Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474 (1933) ; Harrison
v. United States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1925).
271. Young v. Keeling, 130 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1942).
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There is no obligation on the Government to file a written pleading controverting a motion for a new trial when it controverts the
motion in oral argument."' The failure to file a written pleading is
not an admission of the facts set out in the affidavits supporting the
motion.
The defendant is entitled to consideration of his motion. In fact,
the older cases often stated that if the court did consider the motion
and then denied it, the appellate court would not review the denial.278
As early as 1892, the Supreme Court made it clear that the trial court
must give consideration to the motion and exercise the discretion conferred upon it.274

What are concrete examples of failure to exercise

discretion? Where the trial judge failed to act on a motion for a
new trial presented in chambers because he mistakenly thought he
lacked authority to grant it except in court, his action constituted a
failure to exercise discretion. 275 The court had a mistaken view that
it had no jurisdiction. Where the trial judge fails to consider a motion
based on recantation of a witness because he thinks that this is not
a proper ground, the appellate court will order him to consider the
motion.2 7 If at the hearing on the motion for a new trial the trial judge
excludes competent evidence bearing on the issue raised by the motion,
his action is reviewable on appeal. 277 The court referred to the action
of the trial judge as a failure to exercise his discretion, but in reality
27
the judge acted positively and erred in his interpretation of the law. 1
Where the trial court refuses to consider the reasons set out in the
motion, this is a refusal to exercise discretion.27 9 Another instance of
failure to exercise discretion is that of misinterpreting the facts of the
case. In one case, the court, misunderstanding the facts, took an
erroneous view of the purpose and effect of the affidavits offered by the
defendant on his motion for'a new trial. Believing that the facts were
immaterial, it failed to consider the affidavits. The appellate court
272. United States v. Marachowsky, 213 F.2d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1954).
273. Firotto v. United States, 124 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 1942).
274. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
275. Fairmont Glass Co. v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 483 (1933) ; Dwyer
v. United States, 170 Fed. 160 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Notes, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 575, 576
(1950), 32 MICH. L. REv. 387, 392 (1934).

276. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925).
277. Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 482 (1933)
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); Note, 32 MicH. L. REV. 387, 392
(1934).
278. Note, 98 U PA. L. Rtv. 575, 576 (1950).
279. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Ogden v. United States,
112 Fed. 523 (3d Cir. 1902).
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ordered a new trial."' If the court misunderstood the facts of the case
it could not pass on the affidavits properly..
A motion for a new trial may be amended. Such amendment is
more likely to occur where there is newly discovered evidence."8 ' A
supplemental motion has been allowed. 8 2
The hearing on the motion may be held in another district of the
division. 2" When the former circuit courts existed, the hearing was
held before two or three judges."s Today, the hearing is before a
single judge, normally the judge who tried the case. But, there will be
occasions when another judge ought to hear the motion for a new trial.
This is true where it might be necessary for the first judge to testify
28 5

at the hearing on the motion.

When the judge who conducted the first trial withdraws from the
case, the motion for a new trial should be heard by a judge designated
by the chief judge of the court of appeals. 2 6 However, if the motion is
heard by another judge of the district with the consent of the parties,
want of such designation is not reversible error.2 87
Suppose the motion for a new trial is made before the judge who
tried the case, but is left undecided by him because of death or incapacity. May another judge rule on the motion? It has been so
held in federal civil cases.2 8 An early federal criminal case held that
where the trial judge died before passing on the motion and before the
time to move had expired, his successor could have granted a new trial
on the presumption that the trial judge had not been content to enter
judgment on the verdict. 2 9 But, sixty years later it was held that
under the federal statutes and under the prior law, the successor could
pass on the motion where the evidence was taken by way of stenographic
notes or the successor was otherwise satisfied that he could pass on
the motion. 2
The court said that there was no conflict with the
280. Smith v. United States, 281 Fed. 696, 698 (4th Cir. 1922).
281. Johnson v. United States, 149 F.2d 31, 32 (7th Cir. 1945).

282. Lee U. Ong v. United States, 264 Fed. 315 (9th Cir. 1920).
283. Dwyer v. United States, 170 Fed. 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1909).
284. In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891) ; United States v. McKee, 26 Fed. Cas.
1101, No. 15683 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876).
285. Bruno v. United States, 180 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Defendant alleged that there had been no valid waiver of the right to jury trial.
286. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-292, 295-296 (1952).
287. Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1947). The motion was on
the ground of newly discovered evidence.
288. Magee v. General Motors, 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1954), 34 N n. L. Rrv. 153;
see also 47 Micr. L. R~v. 282 (1948).
289. United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. 131, No. 15301 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846).
The history of the rule in England is stated on pp. 137-138 of this report.
290. United States v. Meldrum, 146 Fed. 390 (D. Ore. 1906), aft'd, 151 Fed. 177
(9th Cir. 1907). Both decisions relied on New York Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 291 (1834) ; see 21 NEB. L. Rnv. 171 (1942).
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337

earlier case, as in that case the facts were not preserved. There is no
constitutional right to have only the original judge pass on the
motion.291 Rule 25, which is concerned with the disability of the
presiding judge, makes it possible for another judge to proceed with
the case, "but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform
these duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other
reason, he may in his discretion grant a new trial." The death of
Federal District Judge Hulen of Missouri is likely to raise the issue
very shortly.
The defendant has "no constitutional right to be present at the
hearing" of the motion for a new trial. 2 The hearing on the hotion
"is in no sense a part of the criminal trial at which the Constitution
requires the presence of the accused." 293 Rule 43 does not call for
presence of the defendant.29 4
What about the right to counsel on a motion for a new trial? The
cases are not clear as to the existence of such a right. One case has
simply held that if the motion for a new trial is untimely, so that the
trial court is deprived of its jurisdiction, a defendant cannot complain
if the trial court fails to appoint any of three attorneys requested by the
defendant and instead appoints the attorney who represented him at the
trial, even though the defendant is now antagonistic toward him.295
The retaining of new counsel does not extend the time in which to
move for a new trial even though such counsel is unable to familiarize
himself with the record.296 Where a defendant's counsel continues to
represent him after trial during the period for moving for a new trial,
and counsel fails to move during that period, it must be concluded, in
the absence of a showing that any basis existed for such a motion, that
the motion would have been unavailing.29 7 The accused cannot argue
later in a habeas corpus proceeding that no counsel was provided to
291. United States v. Meldrum, 146 Fed. 390, 395-396 (D. Ore. 1906).
292. Barker v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1944).
293. Id. at 806; accord, Bell v. United States, 129 F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1942).
Both cases involved applications for the writ of error coram nobis. The defendant was
in prison serving his sentence after conviction. For a prior case holding that the defendant has no right to be present at the hearing and determination of his motion for
new trial, and that his absence does not invalidate the sentence, see Alexis v. United
States, 129 Fed. 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1904).
294. The Committee Note says that the rule "does not apply to hearings on motions
made prior to or after trial," and cites United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.
1942).
295. Marion v. United States, 171 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir.), cert .denied, 337 U.S.
944 (1949).
296. Drown v. United States, 198 F.2d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 920 (1953); Pugh v. United States, 197 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1952).
297. Errington v. Hudspeth, 110 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
638 (1940) ; see also De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1939).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2: p. 293

move for a new trial. Where the defendant during the criminal proceeding has had counsel who withdrew with his consent and has employed
new counsel on the day the trial opened, the denial of a continuance
was not a ground for new trial or appeal after the court had pointed
out that there would be an adjournment after the selection of the jury,
at which time counsel could confer with the defendant.2"' Where the
court appointed counsel for defendant who then pleaded guilty, the court
declined to appoint other counsel when defendant moved for a new
2 9
trial and other relief. 1

To what extent must the trial court permit witnesses to testify
for the defendant at the hearing on the motion for a new trial? This
question has been seldom discussed in the cases. But, in a recent
decision of a court of appeals it was held that when the defendant
alleged fraud by the principal witness for the Government, the trial
court need not have heard a witness summoned by the defendant after
he had admitted that the witness could not establish that the principal
witness had lied at the trial."' 0 A defendant may not complain of the
refusal of the trial court to take oral testimony at the hearing on the
3 01
motion for a new trial when he himself offers no testimony.
In practice, testimony of other convicted persons is not likely to
win the defendant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. For example, the court of appeals upheld the district court in
denying a new trial based on the testimony of a prison inmate, convicted
of five felonies, as to statements by a fellow inmate that he had received
certain inducements to testify for the Government."' 2
May the defendant at the hearing on the motion for a new trial
be precluded from presenting evidence by operation of the rules of
privilege in the law of evidence? In one case it was held that a telegram from the codefendant's wife to the codefendant's former attorney
and three letters from the codefendant to such attorney could have been
considered by the court when attached to and made part of the defendant's motion for a new trial, as they were thus made public. The
present attorney for the codefendant could not object. It made no
298. United States v. Yager, 220 F.2d 795, 796 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 963 (1955).
299. United States v. Kelley, 134 F. Supp. 582, 587 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
300. United States v. Rutkin, 208 F.2d 647, 655 (3d Cir. 1953) (Kalodner, J. dissented).
301. United States v. Marachowsky, 213 F.2d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1954).
302. Goodman v. United States, 97 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
578 (1939). When a group of defendants are tried and they fail to take the stand,
they will not be permitted to aid one of their number to secure a new trial by later offering to make statements beneficial to him. McAteer v. United States, 148 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1945) ; Caplin v. United States, 148 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1937).
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difference that the former attorney of the codefendant might have
breached his obligations to his client."
Where a witness testifies one way at the trial and another way at
the hearing on the motion for a new trial, he runs the risk of a perjury
prosecution. If the witness is of low intelligence the court may protect
him by refusing his testimony at the hearing, yet at the same time
assuming that he has in fact changed his story. °4
Where a defendant waives his right to present a portion of his
defense, and on motion for a new trial states that he would not attempt
to establish these facts on a new trial, it should not be granted. 30
One district judge stated that no "useful purpose could be served in
hearing oral argument" on the motion for a new trial since the trial
was free from prejudicial error and defendant's counsel had ably
presented the defense at the trial.30 6
Judge Jerome Frank, in a dissenting opinion, argues that the
majority of the court in denying a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, which merely impeached the evidence brought out
at the trial, in effect holds that the burden of proving innocence is
placed on the defendant, and he can obtain a new trial "only by offering
affirmative evidence to prove his innocence." 307 But, the presumption
of innocence operates only up to conviction. As another judge has
pointed out, a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating
prejudicial error on motion for a new trial. 08° It has been held that
when the defendant upon his motion alleged misconduct of a juror he
had the burden of proving it.8" 9 The Supreme Court has stated that
the trial judge should not make assumptions in favor of the defendant
if the effect is to grant a new trial, but may do so if a denial is involved. 1 '
It would appear that in passing on a motion for a new trial the
court has much more discretion than it has in allowing a motion for
judgment of acquittal under rules 29(a) or 29(b). As Judge Jerome
Frank states in a dissenting opinion:
"A trial judge, before entry of judgment, and if the motion
is timely made, has a wide discretion to order a new trial (as
303.
304.
305.
306.

307.
U.S. 936
308.
309.
310.

States v. Miller, 61 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
v. United States, 229 F.2d 944, 950 (6th Cir. 1956).
States v. Tomlinson, 90 F. Supp. 854, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
States v. Rossello, 107 F. Supp. 621, 622 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
United States v. On Lee, 201 F.2d 722, 724, 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345
(1953).
United States v. Segelman, 86 F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
United States v. Swett, 28 Fed. Cas. 3 No. 16427 (D. Me. 1879).
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
United
Winer
United
United
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distinguished from ordering a directed verdict or entering a
judgment n.o.v.). When he exercises his sound discretion to order
a new trial, his order is reviewable (if at all) only for 'abuse of
discretion'." 1
In reviewing the record on a motion for a new trial, it has been
said that it is particularly important to relive the whole trial imaginatively and not to extract from isolated episodes abstract questions of
evidence and procedure. 1 ' In deciding on the motion, the trial judge
may utilize the knowledge he gained from presiding at the trial as well
as the showing made on the motion.3 18 The trial court may hear and
deny the motion for a new trial without having before it the transscript of testimony given at the trial where counsel for defendant fails
to challenge the accuracy of the summaries of testimony offered by the
Government.' 4 The failure of the defendant to take the stand may
be considered by the trial court in determining the motion for a new
trial and in denying it.313 The court may further consider an issue on
the construction of the federal criminal statutes which impose criminal
liability though not presented during the trial. 16 Prior to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure it was held that the fact that the trial
judge had considered a probation report in determining the motion was
not ground for reversal.3 1 The court stated that this was common
federal practice. The same result would seem likely under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as rule 32(c) (1) provides merely that the
probation report shall not be submitted to the court until the defendant
"has been found guilty."
The district court may proceed to make its ruling on the motion
immediately after the hearing. It was held not objectionable in one
case to have denied the motion "immediately after counsel for the
defendants and for the Government had completed their arguments
311. United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1954). Rule 50 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to a similar effect. Marsh v. Illinois Central R.R.,

175 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1949) ; see also United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C.
1954) ; United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1947).
312. United States v. Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143, 164 (W.D. Pa. 1951). The court
applied an analogous statement of the Supreme Court as to appeals in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 202 (1946).
313. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946); United States v. On Lee,
201 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953) ; Harrison v. United States,
191 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United States v. Derosier, 141 F. Supp. 397 (W.D.

Pa. 1956).
314. United States v. Marachowsky, 213 F.2d 235, 235-240 (7th Cir. 1954).
315. Mayer v. United States, 259 Fed. 216, 217 (6th Cir. 1919).
316. United States v. Decker, 51 F. Supp. 20, 24 (D. Md. 1943).
317. Evans v. United States, 122 F.2d 461, 468 (10th Cir. 1941).
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on the motion." 3" The court may overrule immediately if the motion
raises only issues considered during the trial, but not where it raises
issues arising after submission of the case to the jury, or where newly
discovered evidence is involved. 19 No time limit is fixed in rule 33
as to how late the motion may be ruled upon, but a reasonable time
should be permitted.
Rule 33 permits the defendant to move for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence even though an appeal is pending,
but the motion may be granted only upon remand by the appellate court.
The purpose of this provision is to expedite the proceedings. 20 Where
the trial court finds that the motion should be granted, the court of
appeals, without itself determining whether the motion should be
granted, should remand unless no reasonable basis for the motion exists
3 21
and the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.
When the trial judge rules on a motion for a new trial, must he or
should he write an opinion? District Judge Merrill Otis has asserted
that he has a duty to prepare and file a memorandum of his reasons
not only for the benefit of the parties but particularly for the appellate
court. 22
Judge Mars has pointed out that neither the federal statutes nor
the rules cast any light on the power of the trial judge to reconsider
his denying or granting of a motion for a new trial.3
Where a
motion for reargument of the motion for a new trial is made after
the time for appeal from the denial of the former motion has passed,
denial of the motion for reargument is discretionary, and will be reversed
only for abuse of discretion.3 24 Where no new matter is alleged, denial
of the motion for reargument is proper as granting it amounts to an
attempt to extend the time for appeal from the order denying the
former motion. If a new trial is granted to some of a group of defendants, this is likely to result in a request for reargument by those
denied a new trial. 25
318. United States v. Marachowsky, 213 F.2d 235, 240 (7th Cir. 1954). rhe appellate court will not reverse unless prejudice is shown. Stewart v. United States, 300
Fed. 769, 787 (8th Cir. 1924).
319. Gourdain v. United States, 154 Fed. 453, 460 (7th Cir. 1907). There need be
no stay of proceedings or extent of deliberation.
320. Rakes v. United States, 163 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1947).
321. Ibid.
322. United States v. Walker, 19 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Mo. 1937) ; United States
v. Clark, 19 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
323. United States v. Smith, 156 F.2d 642, 644 (3d Cir. 1946). But he points out
that most state court cases allow reconsideration during the term.
324. United States v. Froehlich, 166 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1948).
325. United States v. Flynn, 131 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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Where a second motion for a new trial is precisely on the same
grounds as the first, the ruling on the first is res judicata. 26
When the defendant moved for a new trial and then escaped, one
court entered an order striking and dismissing the motion unless the
defendant surrendered to the jurisdiction of the court on or before the
first day of the next term. 27
VII.
EFFECTS OF GRANT OF NEW TRIAL.

Suppose the trial court on its own motion grants a new trial.8 2 8
Must an unwilling defendant undergo the second trial? It is to be
doubted that he must. Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court,
has stated: "It may be worthy of note that rule 33 provides that a court
may grant a new trial to a defendant, and does not say that the-court
may order a new trial." 829 An early case held that a new trial would
not -be ordered even in a capital case, if the defendant objected and,
the court warned, that a defendant convicted of manslaughter might be
convicted of murder on the second trial.3
Thus, it would appear that
the trial court may offer a new trial, but may not order it if the defendant objects. In most cases it would be to the defendant's advantage to
accept the offer. However, in cases where the second conviction
might result in a conviction for a more serious crime or might involve
a greater penalty, the defendant should have the right to object.
Mr. Justice Douglas has stated: "In a Sherman Act case, as in
other conspiracy cases, the grant of a new trial to some defendants
and its denial to others is not per se reversible error." 31 When
326. Saunders v. United States, 192 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Wilson v.
United States, 166 F.2d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 1948) (motion to vacate sentence) ; United
States v. Wilfong, 95 F. Supp. 897, 899 (W.D. Mich. 1951) ; United States v. Stephan,
50 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Mich. 1943).
327. United States v. Gilmore, 113 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. W.Va. 1953). As to the
effect of escape pending appeal see Note, 39 COLUM. L. Rv. 1244 (193 9).
328. The Supreme Court pointed out in United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469,
476, n. 5 (1947): "When the draftsmen of the Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted long
before the Criminal Rules, wanted to give the trial judge power to grant a new trial
on his own initiative, they did so in express words. Rule 5(d), Rules of Civil Procedure."
329. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 472, n. 1 (1947). The italics are those
of the Court.
330. United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15301, at 137, 138 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1846).
331. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 247 (1940) ; see also
Rossi v. United States, 278 Fed. 349, 354 (9th Cir. 1922) ; Belfi v. United States, 259
Fed. 822, 829 (3d Cir. 1919) ; United States v. Cohn, 128 Fed. 615, 626 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1904), aff'd sub nom. Browne v. United States, 145 Fed. I (2d Cir. 1905), cert. denied,
200 U.S. 618 (1906).
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error as to one defendant in a conspiracy case requires that a new trial
be granted him, the rights of his codefendants depend upon whether
the error prejudiced them 3 2
Where there is an arraignment and plea at the first trial, these
If the defendant waives trial
are not required at the second trial."
by jury at the first trial this does not preclude him from insisting on
trial by jury at the second trial. 334 The grant of a new trial vacates a
83 5
sentence previously given.
When the defendant is granted a new trial he may be retried on
A reversal and remand by an appellate court leaves
the whole case. 3
a trial court free to proceed as if there had been no former trial, hence
the trial court may consolidate other indictments for trial with this
case. 7 Suppose the defendant was convicted on less than all counts.
May he be retried on all the counts? There seem to be no federal
cases on this point, but a majority of state courts hold that the defendant
may be retried only as to the counts on which he was convicted. This
seems to be a sound interpretation of double jeopardy. 8
A more
severe sentence may be imposed after the second trial where the second
conviction is for the same degree of the offense." 9 The Supreme
Court has even held that on the second trial the defendant may be
convicted of a higher degree of the crime.'" This seems harsh because
the first verdict has two aspects: it is a conviction of the lesser offense,
and, while unreversed, a bar to prosecution for the higher offense. It
would thus appear that the defendant, in obtaining a new trial, does
not voluntarily waive the benefit he gained from this second phase of
the verdict. 34 '
When the defendant is granted a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, he cannot successfully plead double jeopardy
332. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
333. Garland v. Washington, 222 U.S. 642 (1914); United States v. McKnight,
112 Fed. 982, 984 (W.D. Ky. 1902).
334. F. M. Davies & Co. v. Porter, 248 Fed. 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1918) ; Burnhanov
v. North. Chicago St. Ry., 88 Fed. 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1898) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Van Dusen Harrington Co., 34 F.2d 786 (D. Minn. 1929) Annot., 106 A.L.R. 203,

205 (1937).

335. Abbott v. Brown, 241 U.S. 606, 612 (1916).
336. Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 374 (1955)
Trono v. United States,
199 U.S. 521 (1905) ; Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1955).
337. Booth v. United States, 154 Fed. 836, 837 (2d Cir. 1907).
338. See Note, 24 MINN. L. Rgv. 522, 537, 538 (1940).
339. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 17 (1919). The sentence after the second trial was for capital punishment.
340. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 531 (1905) (three justices dissenting)
see also United States v. Harding, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15301, at 138 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846)..
341. Note, 24 MINN. L. Riv. 522, 535, 537 (1940). Contra, ALI OFFICIAL DRAFT
ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY

§

14 (1935).
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at the new trial as he himself made the motion for a new trial thereby
waiving jeopardy. 42
VIII.
APPEAL FROM RULING ON MOTION.

Historically there was no such appeal as exists today after conviction and denial of the motion for a new trial."' There was no appeal
either to the circuit court or to the Supreme Court, although motions
for new trial were often heard by the circuit court sitting en banc.
In 1802 a statute made it possible for the circuit court, upon division of
opinion, to certify questions to the Supreme Court. However, in 1821
the Supreme Court held that this procedure did not cover a motion for
a new trial. 44 But, subsequent cases held that the Supreme Court
could review the ruling on the motion when the question went to the
merits.8 4 In 1891 provision was made for appeal to the courts of appeal
and, about the same time, to the Supreme Court.846
In 1869 Chief Justice Chase stated that the granting of a new
trial is a matter of "pure discretion." 847 It has been asserted that
ordinarily "denial of a motion for a new trial is not reviewable." 348
In fact, some of the older cases state broadly that the denial of a motion
for a new trial is "not assignable as error," 149 or is "not reviewable." 85
The more recent cases give the defendant more protection. For example, it has been stated that "much reliance" must be placed on the
judgment of the trial court.8 5 ' The view now seems to be that the
342. Miller v. United States, 224 F.2d 561, 562 (5th Cir. 1955) ; United States v.
Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15510, at 690 (C.C.E.D. Ind. 1839).
343. ORFISLD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 244 (1939).
344. United States v. Daniel, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 542 (1821)i
345. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
346. OIPIELD,. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 244-246 (1939).
347. United States v. Rosenberg, 74 U.S. 580 (1869). That the Supreme Court
would not review a refusal to grant a new trial on writ of error was held in Holmgren
v. United States, 217 U.S. 509, 521 (1910) ; Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 312
(1894).
348. Beard v. United States, 82 F.2d 837, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; see also Schumacher v. United States, 216 F.2d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Evans v. United States,
122 F.2d 461, 468 (10th Cir. 1941). It has also been said that ordinarily appeal lies
only when the motion is based on newly discovered evidence. Wright v. United States,
295 F.2d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But, an appeal ought to lie after a conviction.
Hamilton v. United States, 140 F.2d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
349. Sutton v. United States, 79 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1935); Boyd v. United
States, 30 F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1929).
350. Banks v. United States, 147 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Joseph v. United
States, 145 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Langer v. United States, 76 F.2d 817, 828 (8th
Cir. 1935) ; Ader v. United States, 284 Fed. 13, 30 (7th Cir. 1922).
351. Hall v. United States, 171 F.2d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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appellate court will review for abuse of discretion 352 or for error of
85 3
law.
It has been held that denial of a motion on the ground of newly
discovered evidence will be reversed only if an abuse of discretion
appears."' On such an appeal, the defendant may not reargue the
proof of guilt given at the trial.8 5 It has been said that an appeal
from a denial of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is frivolous in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion by
the trial court.3 56 It was common to say in the older cases that while
a decision of the trial court on a motion for new trial is not reviewable,
a refusal to entertain such a motion, being a deprivation of a right, is
reviewable. 5 7
The court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review the denial of a
motion for a new trial unless the denial is final."' 8 A question of
finality would be raised if the trial court, while formally denying the
motion on the record, reserved the right to change its mind after the
opinion of an appellate court had been elicited." 9 A recent civil case
has held that granting reargument of a previously denied motion for
a new trial reinstates the motion and deprives the judgment of appealable finality. 6 °
In the ordinary case of appeal where there has been a denial of a
motion for a new trial, the appeal is taken from the judgment and not
from the denial. But in the case of newly discovered evidence appeal
352. Battle v. United States, 206 F.2d 440, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Finnegan v.
United States, 204 F.2d 105, 115 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Patterson v. United States, 183 F.2d
327, 328 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Gage v. United States, 167 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1948) ;
United States v. Smith, 156 F.2d 642, 646 (3d Cir. 1946) ; McAteer v. United States,
148 F.2d 992, 993 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Lockhart v. United States, 136 F.2d 122, 124 (6th
Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Porter, 96 F.2d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Pemberton v.
United States, 76 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1935).
353. Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Cavness v.
United States, 187 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Crenshaw v. United States, 116 F.2d
737, 741 (6th Cir. 1940).
354. United States v. Johnson, 208 F.2d 404, 405 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied. 347
U.S. 928 (1954) ; Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1949) ; McDonnel v. United States, 155 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v. Johnson, 142
F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Long v. United States, 139 F.2d 652, 654 (10th Cir.
1943) ; Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 691-692 (5th Cir. 1941).
355. United States v. Malfetti, 213 F.2d 728, 729 (3d Cir. 1954).
356. United States v. Cordo, 186 F.2d,144, 147 (2d Cir. 1951).
357. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925). The opinion, by
Judge Learned Hand, cited Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). That the
grant of a new trial is discretionary should not bar review since review is always necessary to determine whether the trial court has exercised its discretion. Note, 32
MIcH. L. Rnw. 387, 391-392 (1934).
358. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 474 (1947).

359. Ibid.
360. Kelly v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 925 (1956), 42 VA. L. Rrv. 682.
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is from the denial. The reason for the distinction has been well expressed by Judge Arnold:
"The reason for that rule is that the court may consider the
evidence and the rulings of the trial on appeal from the judgment
itself. A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence rests on a different basis. In such a case the newly discovered evidence does not appear in the record supporting the
judgment."

861

Historically, it was often suggested that a review by the appellate
court must be denied because writ of error lay only for matters within
the record, of which the motion for a new trial was not a part.
However, this is not a basis for denial of review today since the record
before the appellate court has been enlarged to include in the bill of
exceptions the motion for a new trial whether the motion is made before
or after judgment.362 When the defendant appeals on the ground of
newly discovered evidence he must furnish the appellate court a record
of such content as to show the alleged errors.836 Where, on appeal
from denial of a motion for a new trial, the Government wishes to place
the transcript of the oral argument on the motion for a new trial before
the court of appeals, application must be made to the court of appeals as
the district court has no jurisdiction." 4
The time for appeal from an order denying a motion for a new
trial may not be extended by a motion for reargument. 365 An untimely
motion for a new trial does not toll the running of the ten-day period
for taking an appeal." 6 With respect to the time in which to appeal
from a denial of a new trial it should be noted that under rule 37(a) (2)
even though the motion for a new trial was not filed within five days
after conviction, where such motion is filed within ten days after
entry of judgment, appeal from the judgment taken within ten days
after the entry of the order denying the motion is timely.

67

Rule 33

361. Hamilton v. United States, 140 F.2d 679, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1944). This case
was followed in Wright v. United States, 215 F.2d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; accord,
United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 (1946); Balistreri v. United States, 224
F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir.
1951).
362. Compare Fairmont Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 482
(1933), with Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1925) ; see Note, 32
MICH. L. R.v. 387, 388-390 (1934).
363. Balistreri v. United States, 224 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1955).
364. United States v. Marachowsky, 15 F.R.D. 130 (W.D. Wis. 1953).
365. United States v. Froelich, 166 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1948).
366. Pugh v. United States, 197 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Marion v. United States,
171 F.2d 185, 186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 944 (1949) (motion made five
weeks after verdict).
367. Lujan v. United States, 204 F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1953). Thus, in this unusual
situation the.trial court could not consider the motion for new trial while the appellate
court could, unless there had been an extension during the original five days or unless
the ground was newly discovered evidence.
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concerns itself only with time for filing a motion for a new trial, while
the time for appeal is prescribed in rule 37(a) (2).
Where the defendant reasonably failed to object on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence through motion for acquittal, the court of
appeals will look into this subject only far enough to ascertain whether
it is reasonably clear that there was a miscarriage of justice. 6
It is
not enough to raise the issue for the first time by motion for a new
trial. 69 An early decision by the Supreme Court held that it would
not review the question whether the verdict was contrary to the evidence
if there was any proper evidence to support the verdict.3 7 °
Mr. Justice Douglas has stated: "Certainly, denial of a motion for
a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence would not be subject to review." -37 The Supreme Court,
through Justice Murphy, has stated that the verdict must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
372
Government, to support it.
Suppose the evidence at the hearing on the motion for a new trial
consists only of affidavits, depositions, and documents. It has been
suggested that the court of appeals is then in as good a position as the
trial court to make deductions and conclusions.
Suppose an appeal is taken from the denial of a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and it appears that
the only objection is to the trial court's findings on conflicting evidence
and that there was evidence to support the findings. The Supreme
Court held, a month before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
went into effect, that there is then no reviewable issue of law, and the
appeal should be dismissed as frivolous. 74 The findings of the trial
court should remain undisturbed except in most extraordinary circumstances. It is not the province of the federal appellate courts to review
368. Knight v. United States, 213 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Jordan v. United
States, 120 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Edwards v. United States, 7 F.2d 357, 359
(8th Cir. 1925) ; Utley v. United States, 5 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1925) ; Feinberg v.
United States, 2 F.2d 955, 956 (8th Cir. 1924) ; Lockhart v. United States, 264 Fed.
14, 16 (6th Cir. 1920).
369. Baird v. United States, 279 Fed. 509, 511 (6th Cir. 1922).
370. Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891). It. was held that one cannot
assign as error that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. Moore v. United States,
150 U.S. 57, 62 (1893).
371. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 248 (1940).
372. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
373. United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 43 (7th Cir. 1945) (dictum).
374. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106 (1946), reversing 149 F.2d 31 (7th
Cir. 1945). The case is followed in Wolcher v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 254, 255
(1955) ; United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Harrison v. United
States, 161 F.2d 47, 55 (8th Cir. 1947).
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orders granting or denying new trials when such review is sought on
the ground that the trial court made erroneous findings of fact.
Mr. Justice Douglas has stated that it is a
"well-established rule that neither this Court nor the circuit court
of appeals will review the action of a federal trial court in granting
or denying a motion for a new trial for error of fact, since such
action is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
Certain exceptions have been noted, such as instances where the
trial court has erroneously excluded from consideration matters
which were appropriate to a decision on the motion."
Will the court of appeals consider facts not brought to the attention
of the trial court? Normally it will not. But in one case the court
looked to another case tried in the same court and thus ascertained that
the witness for the Government had not committed perjury.876 As a
result the court affirmed a denial of the motion for a new trial.
Where the trial of a case is by a judge without a jury, the appellate
court is often less likely to reverse for erroneous admissions of evidence since the trial judge may state expressly that he disregarded such
7
evidence.Y 7
Where a witness for the prosecution makes a written recantation of
his testimony which is produced in evidence after his death and the
trial court denies a new trial, it has been held that the denial is not
reviewable by the court of appeals and that the only recourse is to
executive clemency.878
' When, on appeal, the Government confesses error in the introduction of certain exhibits, the court of appeals will reverse and remand for
a new trial."7 ' Where, after conviction in the district court and affirmance in the court of appeals, certiorari is granted and the Government
then confesses error, the case will be remanded to the district court with
directions to vacate its denial of a new trial and to grant a new trial.8 80
The court of appeals has no power itself to entertain a motion for
a new trial. 881 But, where the court of appeals is satisfied that the trial
375. United States v.
Cavness v. United States,
376. United States v.
U.S. 928 (1954).
377. United States v.

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 247 (1940) ; see also
187 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1951).
Johnson, 208 F.2d 404, 405 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
Aderman, 209 F.2d 777, 779 (7th Cir. 1954).

378. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S.
706 (1925).

379. United States v. Kaplan, 156 F.2d 922, 923 (2d Cir. 1946).
380. Fogel v. United States, 335 U.S. 865 (1948). The court of appeals had divided two to one, 167 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1948). The dissenting judge found that the defendant had exercised due diligence.
381. Wagner v. United States, 118 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1941). But, it was sug-

gested that in a small group of cases the appellate court might entertain the motion
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court erred in denying a new trial, it may reverse the conviction and
When the
remand the case with a direction to grant a new trial.8
case has gone to the Supreme Court, it has remanded to the district
The Supreme Court
court with a direction to grant a new trial."
stated that under the Judiciary Act of 1789 "it has never been questioned
that this court possessed authority upon reversal for error to award a
new trial." "' A like power was conferred on the courts of appeal and
the former circuit courts. 8 5
Sometimes reversal by the court of appeals will involve remand to
district
court with a direction to hear a motion for a new trial
the
though not necessarily to grant it.88 Normally, when the appellate
court reverses the judgment of the trial court denying a motion for a
new trial, it reverses the judgment and orders the district court to
grant a new trial. But, it may also vacate the judgment entered on the
verdict and remand the case to the district court with directions to
rehear the motion for a new trial. 8 7
When the trial court denies a motion for a judgment of acquittal
or, in the alternative, for a new trial under rule 29(b) the court of
appeals has the power to reverse and remand for a new trial and is not
required to direct an acquittal. Rule 29 applies to the district court but
The powers of the appellate court are
not to the court of appeals."8
governed by 28 U.S.C. section 2106.
An application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence after an appeal has been taken must be made in the trial
court; the court of appeals will remand only in the event the trial court
evidences a willingness to grant the motion. 8
under its ancillary' jurisdiction, as where the trial court refused to hear the motion
because a writ of error had issued. Dowling v. United States, 23 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.
1928).
382. Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904, 912 (6th Cir. 1953) ; United States
v. Di Matteo, 169 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1948). In one case the appellate court directed
a prompt new trial because the jury tampering was attempted to favor acquittal. Rakes
v. United States, 163 F.2d 771, 773 (4th Cir. 1947).
383. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 153 (1892).
384. Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 167, 199 (1895).
385. Id. at 167, 201-202.
386. Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885
(1953). The right of the defendant to discovery under rule 17(c) had been improperly
denied; but it was not clear to the appellate court that the denial of discovery was
prejudicial.
387. Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1943). In this case
the parties failed to adduce the correct type of evidence on a motion for new trial.
Affidavits had been relied on exclusively.
388. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), 38 Gto. L. J. 680; see Orfield,
Judgment Notstthstanding the Verdict in Federal Criminal Cases, 16 U. Pn'r. L.
Rzv. 101, 119-121 (1955).
389. Knight v. United States, 213 F.2d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Smith v. Pollen,
194 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Zamlock v. United States, 187 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1951) ;
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May the trial court grant a motion for a new trial because of
newly discovered evidence after affirmance of the conviction by the court
of appeals without leave first having been obtained from that court?
Prior to the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933 and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure it could not. But since that time it may. 39° The
term "final judgment" in rule 33 includes the mandate of affirmance
of the court of appeals.
Mandamus may not be used to compel a federal district judge to
file a motion for a new trial, as filing is not necessary, or, if it were
necessary, such filing would be done by the clerk . 9 But, the Government is entitled to mandamus and prohibition against a district judge
to compel vacating of an order on his own motion granting a new trial
more than five days after conviction and after affirmance by the court
3 2
of appeals.
Ix.
WRIT OF ERROR CORAm NOBIS.

The courts have occasionally treated an application for coram
nobis as tantamount to a motion for a new trial. Thus, an application
for coram nobis filed eighteen months after conviction alleging newly
discovered evidence in the form of new witnesses to sustain proof of
perjury and also alleging admission of testimony of an incompetent
witness was treated as a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 3' Since it was filed too late under the existing rule as
to motion for a new trial, it was denied. In another case, arising after
the adoption of rule 33, the court held that an application for coram
nobis to vacate a judgment of conviction and grant a new trial so that
the applicant might interpose the defense of insanity at the time of the
offense as well as the time of the trial, was treated as being in one aspect
a motion for a new trial. 94 Since more than two years had elapsed
United States v. Minkoff, 181 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Rakes v. United States, 163
F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir. 1947). In Heald v. United States, 175 F.2d 878, 883 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859 (1949). The court of appeals entertained and passed
on a motion to remand, but failed to discuss the change in the rule. See also Metcalf
v. United States, 195 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1952).
390. Harrison v. United States, 191 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1951).
391. Young v. Keeling, 130 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1942).
392. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 (1947); see also United States v.
Simon, 225 F.2d 260, 263, n.4 (3d Cir. 1955).
393, Meredith v. United States, 138 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1943).
394. United States v. Landicho, 72 F. Supp. 425, 426 (D. Alaska 1947), 1 VAND.
L. Rtv. 137. Professor Donnelly calls this a "confused decision." Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. Riv. 20, 26 n.31 (1952).
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after conviction, a new trial could not be granted. 95 Habeas corpus
rather than new trial or coram nobis was the proper remedy3 96
Where the courts have discussed coram nobis in relation to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure they have usually compared it to
motion for a new trial under rule 33. But, in a few cases it has been
compared to correction of an illegal sentence under rule 35. In one case
it was held that a prisoner alleging insanity at the time of his trial and
conviction must apply for relief in the sentencing court under rule 35
and that in effect rule 35 codified coram nobis.397 However, such an
application of coram nobis would not seem to protect an innocent defendant who desires not simply to correct a sentence, but to be relieved
of it altogether."' An innocent defendant is usually in no position to
raise jurisdictional or constitutional issues. Where rule 35 does apply,
happily there is no time limit, since the first sentence of the rule provides: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." A
restriction on rule 35 greatly limiting its scope is that the motion under
rule 35 presupposes a valid conviction. 399
The federal courts early recognized that coram nobis was available
in civil cases." ° But, rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1948, abolishes it in civil cases. The Supreme
Court stated in 1914 that coram nobis, if appropriate at all in criminal
cases, might be appropriate only where there were errors of fact so
fundamental as to render the whole proceeding void. 4 " It was not until
1944 that a federal court held that coram nobis was available in criminal cases as to the right to counsel." 2
But, by the time of the 1948 Revision of the Civil Code, six circuits had held that the writ was available. 3
395. United States v. Landicho, supra note 394 at 428. The court referred to the
history of the drafting of rule 33.
396. Id. at 428-429.
397. Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F.2d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846
(1948), 1 VAND. L. Rzv. 292.
398. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. Rev. 20, 26 n.31 (1952).
399. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954) ; In re Shephard, 195
F.2d 157, 158 (1st Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 570 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
926 (1949).
400. Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 678 (1886) ; Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 144, 148 (1833) ; see cases cited in Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram
Nobis in Civil Practice,20 VA. L. REv. 423, 442 (1934).
401. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914). In United States v. Smith,
331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947) the Court speculated by way of dictum that there was no
great need for such a remedy.
402. United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944). But earlier cases admitted its availability in other cases. Tinkoff v. United States, 129 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.
1942) ; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Strang v. United States,
53 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1931).
403. See cases cited in 53 COLUM. L. Rxv. 737, 738 n.5 (1953). As to the history
of the revival of the writ see Orfield, Who Discovered Coram Nobis?, 40 A.B.A.J. 464
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That coram nobis is available in federal criminal cases was finally
determined by the Supreme Court in 1954. The case raising the issue
was most unusual on its facts. In 1939 Robert Morgan pleaded guilty
to a charge of mail theft and was sentenced by the federal district
court to four years imprisonment. He served his term and was released. In 1950 he was convicted of a crime in a state court of New
York and sentenced as a second offender because of his previous federal conviction. In 1952 he made application to the federal district
court of original sentence for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate
his conviction on the ground that he was not given assistance of counsel and had not waived his right to such assistance. His motion was
4 4
denied. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for hearing. "
On certiorari to the Supreme Court it was held in a five to four decision that Morgan was entitled to show by a motion in the nature of
error coram nobis that the federal conviction and sentence should be
set aside." 5 The power to grant the writ in this case was based on the
"all-writs" section of the Code4 6 and not on 28 U.S.C. section 2255
through which a prisoner in custody can attack an illegal sentence. The
dissenting justices believed that the writ was not "in aid of" the jurisdiction of the district court since its jurisdiction had long since terminated, and was not "agreeable to the usages and principles" of current law since the writ, if it ever existed in the federal courts, was
superseded by the motion under section 2255.
The decision does not offer much guidance as to when the writ is
available. On the facts of the particular case it was held available because of alleged deprivation of the right to counsel when the applicant
is not now in custody. The Court says nothing about the former restriction that coram nobis lies only as to errors not treated or passed on
at the trial. Seemingly the facts which justify coram nobis procedure
need not have been unknown to the judge. As to the restriction that
the error must be fundamental in character the Court seems to equate
this with deprivation of due process. While at common law an error
of fact had to be shown, it would now appear that errors of law may
404. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1953), 53 COLUM. L. R v. 737,
66 HARV. L. Rtv. 1137, 63 YALE L. J. 115, 123.
405. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), 42 GFo. L. J. 461, 53 MICH.
L. Rev. 144, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 340, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. Rrv. 295. For criticism of the
decision see Amandes, Coram Nobis-Panaceaor Carcinoma, 7 HASTINGs L.J. 48, 58
(1955) ; Briggs, Coram Nobis, 17 MONT. L. Rev. 160, 189 n.146 (1956).
406. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1952) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The
only prior case to base the writ on this statute was the concurring opinion of Biggs,
J. in United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442, 445 (3d Cir. 1944).
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be shown. Error of fact is said to be involved when there is an issue
as to whether the right to counsel was waived.
Prior restrictions on the writ as developed by the lower federal
courts seem no longer in effect. These restrictions were: (1) the petitioner must show reasonable diligence in making his application; (2) he
must allege his innocence and show a meritorious defense of which he
was deprived and which could lead to a different result in the event of
retrial; and (3) the matter must be raised when he is convicted as a
second offender." 7 There is no time limit on the writ or any doctrine
of laches. However, it seems reasonably clear that the allegation of
innocence has no bearing on the issue of whether procedural due process
was accorded in the federal prosecution.4 "8
The Morgan case has been construed as not changing the requirement that the motion or supporting affidavits must state, with particularity, sufficient facts to constitute a ground of relief." 9 There must
be a direct allegation of the absence of intelligent waiver of counsel.
When the Morgan case was considered again on remand, the court of
appeals held that the defendant need not establish his innocence and
that long delay did not bar the writ of error coram nobis.410 Where the
records show a waiver of counsel and entry of a plea of guilty, coram
nobis is not available.4 ' If a defendant pleads guilty without requesting assistance of counsel, his waiver, to be effective, must be intelligently made.4" 2 Coram nobis was allowed to an eighteen-year-old boy
who did not intelligently waive assistance of counsel when he pleaded
guilty. 41 3

Where the defendant alleges that he was insane at time of

sentence and, therefore, could not intelligently waive his right to counsel, yet fails to show such insanity, coram nobis will be denied.41 4 The
mere fact that the clerk's records do not contain the name of counsel
assigned for petitioner is not a ground for release on coram nobis 15
407. United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849

(1948).

408. Note, 1955 U. ILL. L. FORUM 617.
409. Gordon v. United States, 216 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1954). The concurring
opinion of Judge Rives suggests a doctrine of laches, but the majority opinion seems

contra.
410. United States v.

Morgan, 222 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 122 F.
Supp. 623 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), 1955 U. ILL L. FORUM 617. This case was followed in
Farnsworth v. United States, 232 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (one judge dissenting).
The same view had earlier been expressed in Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp.
485 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

411. United States v. Day, 232 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1956).
412. United States v. Nickerson, 124 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1954). Coram nobis
was granted.

413. United States v. Vargas, 124 F. Supp. 195 (D. Puerto Rico 1954).
414. United States v. King, 128 F. Supp. 664 (D. Wyo. 1955).

415. Haywood v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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Where the defendant's detention by the state court is in no way affected
by his federal conviction, coram nobis is not available. 16 It is not a
ground for coram nobis that a defendant was indicted without a prior
arrest or commitment by a United States Commissioner, or that the
evidence introduced at the trial was incompetent when that issue had
been raised unsuccessfully on an appeal from the conviction.417 Where
the defendant has two counsel and they both fail to except to the court's
instructions to the jury, coram nobis does not lie.41
Coram nobis
does not lie to try the contentions of the defendant that he was denied
due process of law at the trial because of a fatal variance between proof
and allegations of the indictment by reason of an alleged misinterpretation of law by the prosecutor which allegedly deceived the trial court
and defendant's counsel. 41 9 A recent case has suggested that coram
nobis is not available where sentence has not been served, or where the
defendant has not begun to serve the sentence which he attacks. The
writ may issue only in aid of the jurisdiction of the court in which the
conviction was had. 2 ° Absence of counsel at the time of sentencing,
if shown, seems to be a ground for coram nobis.421 Where the trial
court denies coram nobis the court of appeals will not reverse if the
findings of the trial court are not clearly erroneous. 2
It should be
noted that almost every case on coram nobis since the Morgan decision
involved the right to counsel and a defendant charged with multiple
offenses who was burdened with a more severe penalty because of a
federal conviction alleged to be erroneous. In one of the rare cases
not involving a multiple offender, a petition for coram nobis was treated
as a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 where the grounds
of the petition were the same as under the statute.423
Lower federal court decisions would seem to warrant coram nobis
on a number of other grounds. Insanity at the time of the trial should
be a ground; 424 as should knowing use of perjured testimony; 423 sup416. United States v. Oddo, 129 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
417. United States v. Tees, 211 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1954).
418. Lopez v. United States, 217 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1955).
419. United States v. Aderman, 216 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1954). Defendant had been
represented by counsel and was himself a lawyer.
420. Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577, 578 n.2 (9th Cir. 1955).
421. Mitchell v. United States, 228 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Davis v. United
States, 226 F.2d 834, 839 (8th Cir. 1955).
422. United States v. Norton, 234 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1956).
423. United States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.J. 1954). Representation by
incompetent counsel was alleged.
424. Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947); Roberts v. United
States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1001 (9th
Cir. 1941).
425. Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1946).
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pression of evidence by the prosecution; 428 fraud or duress in obtaining
a plea of guilty; " mob domination at the trial; 428 and the judge's
lack of ability to act intelligently because of mental or physical disability.429 The federal courts should include within its scope the present
grounds under which federal habeas corpus proceedings and a motion
under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 may be made.43 If that were done there
would seem to be little need for 28 U.S.C. section 2255. 48 '
Insufficiency of the indictment is not a ground, 43 2 nor is the fact
that a material witness was later adjudged insane.4 3 On the merits
it ought to lie where the innocence of the defendant is conclusively
proved by newly discovered evidence. 4 A few state courts have permitted coram nobis in such cases.4 5 But, the federal courts have
denied the writ on this ground." 6 There can be no relief under rule 33
which fixes a time limit of two years, hence the defendant's only relief
is a pardon." 7 Granting coram nobis for newly discovered evidence
would fill a big gap in rule 33.
In the view of the Supreme Court, the motion for coram nobis is a
in
step the criminal case, unlike habeas corpus in which relief is sought
in a separate case and record, and which is the beginning of a separate
426. See Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 906 tJ949).
427. United States v. Mahoney, 43 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. La. 1942) (by implication).
428. Habeus corpus lies. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
429. Note, 37 HARV. L. Rgv. 744, 747 (1924) ; see Jordan v. Commonwealth, 225
U.S. 167 (1912).
430. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786, 792 (1950).
431. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1310
(1943).
432. Kelley v. United States, 138 F.2d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 1943).
433. United States v. Gardzielewski, 135 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1943).
434. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 524 (1947); Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 VAND. L. REv. 20, 39 (1952) ; Note, 39 MICH. L.
REv. 963, 969 (1941) ; Note, 36 MINN. L. Rxv. 533, 535-36 (1952).
435. George v. State, 211 Ind. 429, 439, 6 N.E.2d 336, 340 (1937) ; Davis v. State,
200 Ind. 88, 106, 161 N.E. 375, 382 (1928) ; Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 168
S.W.2d 48 (1943), 32 Ky. L.J. 296 (1944); Humphreys v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224
Pac. 937 (1924) (dissenting opinion), 24 COLUM. L. REV. 797; see Note, 39 MIcH. L.
REv. 963 (1941).
436. United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 68-69 (1914) ; Reid v. United States,
149 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805, 807 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 741 (1944) ; Meredith v. United States, 138 F.2d 772 (6th Cir.
1943) ; United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), 36 MINN. L. REv.
533 (1952) ; cf. United States v. Gardzielewski, 135 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1943) ; United
States v. Taylor, 49 F. Supp. 353-54 (N.D. W.Va. 1943).
437. Reid v. United States, 149 F.2d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Hauck v. Hiatt,
141 F.2d 812, 813 (3d Cir. 1944) (confession of another that he had committed the
crime) ; Figueroa v. Saldano, 23 F.2d 327-28 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
574 (1928).
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civil proceeding. 483 As such a step it is not governed by rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which expressly abolishes
coram nobis in civil cases. It is of the same general character as the
motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure is inapplicable since it applies only to sentences
not authorized by the judgment of conviction. The procedure and time
limits for taking an appeal from a denial by the district court of an
application for coram nobis seem not to have been discussed in the
decisions. Many cases have permitted appeals.
The hearing on the writ of error coram nobis may be had on
affidavits or other evidentiary matter submitted by the defendant and
the Government. It is not necessary that the defendant be brought
to the court of sentencing to testify orally."0 But, unless the affidavits
show that the defendant's contentions are without foundation he should
440
be present at the hearing and be permitted to testify.
A distinct advantage of coram nobis over habeas corpus in cases
involving multiple offenders is that there is no requirement of exhaust44 1
ing state remedies. '
The holding in the Morgan case seems desirable. No relief under
28 U.S.C. section 2255 is possible as the defendant is not in custody.
No relief under rule 33 is possible as the time allowed has elapsed. It
is clear now that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has not resulted in the abolition of coram nobis.442 It is also
clear that the writ is not granted exclusively under 28 U.S.C. section
2255 as had been suggested by many cases before the Morgan case.443
The Morgan case makes possible the protection of persons seeking to
eliminate the disabilities consequent upon an erroneous federal con44 4
viction.
438. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954); see also Bruno v.
United States, 180 F.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
439. See Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 741 (1944) ; United States v. Mahoney, 43 F. Supp. 943, 945 (W.D. La. 1942).
But, on an issue of fact the defendant should be present. United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 221 n.36 (1952).
440. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1953) ; see Note, 59 YALE
L.J. 786, 792 (1950), suggesting that there be a hearing on the merits unless, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952), the motions, files and records in the case show that
relief is not in order.
441. Note, 53 COLUM. L. Rlv. 737, 739 (1953).
442. For an earlier case holding contrary, see Lucas v. United States, 114 F. Supp.
581, 582 (N.D. W.Va. 1948). In United States v. Kerschman, 201 F.2d 682, 684 (7th
Cir. 1953), the court seems to say that rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure had abolished error coram nobis even in criminal cases.
443. The Supreme Court seems to say that in some cases coram nobis overlaps
with the procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502, 510 (1954) ; see United States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.J. 1954).
444. As to the nature of these disabilities see Notes, 63 YALn L.J. 115 (1953), 59
YALn L.J. 786 (1950).
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X.
MOTION UNDER

28 U.S.C.

SECTION

2255

AND

HABEAS CORPUS.

Under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 prisoners in custody under a federal sentence who claim the right to be released because of a violation
of their constitutional rights, or because of lack of jurisdiction in the
sentencing court, or because their sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may make a motion to the sentencing court to have the
sentence set aside, vacated, or corrected.4 4
The procedure under section 2255 is a prerequisite to a federal
habeas corpus proceeding by those in federal custody. It was primarily designed to relieve federal district courts in those districts in
which federal prisons are located of the very heavy burden of habeas
corpus applications.4 46 Habeas corpus may be used only if the motion
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of imprisonment. In
lie it will be brought in the
the rare cases in which habeas corpus will
44 7
prisoner.
the
of
confinement
of
district
The rule against collateral impeachment of the record applied in
habeas corpus cases 448 does not apply to a motion under section 2255
because the motion is "lodged in the criminal case in which the judgment is. being subjected to direct attack." "' It may be noted that
rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Clerical
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and-errors
in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders."
It would appear that habeas corpus gives the prisoner more prompt
relief than the motion under section 2255. As to habeas corpus the
courts are required to issue the writ "forthwith"; prison wardens are
required to file returns in three days unless additional time is granted;
and hearings must start within five days.450 On the other hand sec445. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) provides in part as follows: "A prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
"A motion for such relief may be made at any time."
446. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
447. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1952). For cases involving habeas corpus under the 1948
statute see Annot. 20 A.L.R. 2d 976, 998 (1951).
448. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335-336 (1923). The prisoner was, therefore,
not allowed to show that there were only eleven men on the trial jury since the record
recited that there was "a jury of good and lawful men."
449. Snell v. United States, 174 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1949). The right to counsel was involved.
450. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952).
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tion 2255 places no time limit on the preliminary steps, although it
does speak of a "prompt hearing." The requirement of motion procedure under section 2255 as a prerequisite to habeas corpus slows the
speed of granting habeas corpus,4 ' but has not been held constitutionally objectionable.
In a habeas corpus proceeding the court upon hearing and deliberation shall "dispose of the matter as law and justice requires." 452
But under section 2255 the court "shall vacate and set the judgment
aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a
new trial or correct the sentence as may be appropriate." Thus, on
such a motion there may be a new trial.4 58
With respect to habeas corpus, "no circuit or district judge shall
be required to entertain" an application for habeas corpus
"if it appears that the legality of such detention has been deter.mined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented or determined, and the judge
or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by
such inquiry." 454
But, under section 2255 the sentencing court "shall not be required
to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf
of the. same prisoner." Thus, it would seem easier to obtain habeas
corpus."' Suppose a second motion under section 2255 presents new
grounds and is not entertained, is the "remedy by motion inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality" of the detention, within the meaning
of section 2255 ? It would seem that it is.
How does the motion under section 2255 compare with corarn
nobis and motion for a new trial as to its grounds? In practice coram
nobis like habeas corpus has been used in the federal courts chiefly to
attack convictions obtained in violation of jurisdictional requirements or
other constitutional safeguards.45" The grounds enumerated in section 2255 seem to be no broader than those for which habeas corpus
451. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183, 1189 (1950).
452. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952).
453. This is thought to be incongruous in Longsdorf, The Federal Habeasr Corpus
Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407, 422 (1953).
454. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1952).
455. Compare Moss v. United States, 117 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1949), 59 YALJ L.J.
24
(1950), with Dunn v. United States, 234 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1956);
1183, 1188 n.
Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950), 20 A.L.R.2d 976, 996 (1951).
456. Note, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 1137 (1953).
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may issue. 457 But, coram nobis may also be available for less fundamental defects such as insanity of the defendant at the trial.458 Further,
as has been seen, the grounds for a new trial are virtually unlimited since
a new trial may be granted "in the interest of justice"; unfortunately,
however, there are time limits on granting a new trial.
Chief Judge Parker has stated the following sweeping limitations as to habeas corpus and motion under section 2255:
"It is elementary that neither habeas corpus nor motion in
the nature of application for writ of error coram nobis can be
availed in lieu of writ of error or appeal to correct errors in the
course of a trial, even though such errors relate to constitutional
rights. It is only where there has been the denial of the substance
of a fair trial that the validity of the proceedings may be thus
collaterally attacked or questioned by motion in the nature of a
petition for writ of error coram nobis or under 28 U.S.C.
2255." 459
Another case suggests that the motion lies
"where there has been a denial of the right to counsel, or where
the assistance of counsel is 'such . . . as to shock the conscience
of the court, and make the [trial] a farce and a mockery of justice'; or where a plea of guilty was entered as a result of coercion,
or deception, by the prosecution; or where there was mob domination at the trial; or where the prosecution has failed in the duty
that it owes to the defendant to refrain from methods that would
corrupt the administration of justice as, for example, where the
prosecutor has knowingly used false testimony to secure a conviction, or has caused evidence to be suppressed." 460
But, the same case makes it clear that the motion does not lie where
the testimony against the prisoners was not wilfully false; or where,
if there was perjury, the prosecution did not know of it; nor because
457. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) ; Myers v. United States, 181
F.2d 802, 803-805 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950) ; United States v.
Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 12 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 533, 534
(1952) ; Note, 59 YALx L.J. 786, 789 (1950). For a discussion of habeas corpus prior
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952), see Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal
Courts, B.U.L. RIv. 26 (1945).
458. Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947). But possibly a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) is available here too; see Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d
707 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Sanders v. Allen, 100 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; United States
v. Landicho, 72 F. Supp. 425 (D. Alaska 1947).
459. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
906 (1949). This case is cited with approval in United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp.
7, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
460. United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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another has confessed and absolved the prisoner, nor because there is
newly discovered evidence.46 '
There are serious limitations on the scope of the grounds for the
motion under section 2255.4"2 It has been said that the motion cannot be used to directly attack any matter litigated in the original trial."i
For example, new evidence is not a ground for invoking the motion
just as it is not a ground for coram nobis. 4 6 4

It cannot be used to

fact.465

review questions of
It cannot be used as a substitute for
appeal.466 This rule against direct attack of any matter litigated in
the original trial is applied despite the conclusiveness of the new evidence on which the attack is based. Thus, a confession by another
inmate is not a ground for the motion.4 67 In practice the most common
ground alleged is deprivation of counsel.468 The motion is rarely
granted.469
The motion under section 2255 is to be made in the sentencing
court.47 0 To that extent it resembles a motion for a new trial and an
application for coram nobis which are to be made in the court which
tried the case. It is made to vacate a federal sentence under which the
movant is imprisoned. It does not lie after the sentence has been
served. In that respect it appears to resemble the motion for a new
trial, as the time limit for motion for a new trial will normally have
expired after the sentence has been served; the five-day period for the
461. Id. at 13. The court did not refer to coram nobis, but does say that avenues
of judicial redress are closed here to the defendant, and he can only seek a pardon;
see also Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Derosier, 141 F. Supp. 397, 401 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
462. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 976, 982-993 (1951).
463. Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 532, 534 (1952).
464. United States v. Riccardi, 188 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v.
Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Suggesting that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952)
be amended to make new evidence a ground, see Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent,
6 VAND. L. Rzv. 20, 38 (1952).
465. United States v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
913 (1951) ; Baldwin v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 310, 313 (E.D.S.C. 1956). In
United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), Judge Weinfeld stated
that "the court is not empowered to review the jury's determination of the facts or to
correct errors committed upon the trial." It cannot be used to attack the sufficiency of
the evidence.
466. Ford v. United States, 234 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Martin v. Hiatt, 174
F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1949) ; see Note 61 HARV. L. R~v. 657, 667 (1948) ; Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 976, 987 (1951).
467. Hauck v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1944); McGuire v. Hunter, 138 F.2d
379 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. granted and case remanded, 322 U.S. 710 (1944). But discovery of perjured testimony was held a ground in Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 355
(6th Cir. 1938), though not in United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
468. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 978, 979, 982, 988 (1951).
469. Id. at 978, 982.
470. See Note on the Motion to Vacate, Coram Nobis and Habeas Corpus, HART
& WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS. AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM,
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normal motion for a new trial will have expired, and often the twoyear period for newly discovered evidence; but doubtless there may be
some cases where the two-year period has not expired, and then it
would seem that motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence
should be available.4 7' As has been seen coram nobis may be available
though the sentence has been served. There is no time limit as to the
motion under section 2255.472

In this respect it is a much more useful

remedy than motion for a new trial except that it is not available if
the sentence has been served so that the defendant is no longer in
custody under the sentence.
There is no express provision in section 2255 for notice to the
prisoner of a hearing or for requiring or securing his presence, and one
clause of the section states that the court may determine the issues
ex parte.4 73 But, the Supreme Court construed the clause providing
for a "prompt hearing" as requiring the presence of the prisoner where
the motion raised "substantial issues of fact as to events in which the
prisoner participated." 474 Hence, any issues of constitutionality were
avoided. The sentencing court had power under 28 U.S.C. section
1651 (a) to order production of the prisoner from another federal
district.
A defendant isnot constitutionally entitled to counsel when he
moves under section 2255.475 Itisnot clear that there isa right to
counsel when a defendant moves for a new trial, although a criminal
proceeding is then involved while a motion under section 2255 seems
to be a civil action. 476 The cases have not clearly said that there is
a right to counsel when the defendant applies for a writ of error coram
nobis even though this is regarded as a step in a criminal proceeding.
The time for alpeal from a motion under section 2255 is different
from that as to an appeal from denial of a motion for a new trial.
Appeal from denial of a motion for a new trial must be made within
471. United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.

979 (1952), 347 U.S. 945 (1954).
472. It seems inconsistent to have a time limit in FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 and none in
28 U.S.C. §2255 (1952). FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 authorizes the court to "correct an illegal
sentence at any time"; see HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDtRAL SYSTEM, 1311 (1933).
473. For criticism of the section see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950).
474. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952), 66 HARV. L. RZv. 167,
27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 465, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1054; Parks v. United States, 233 F.2d
321 (5th Cir. 1956); Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts, 40 CALIF. L. Rzv. 335

(1952).
In habeas corpus, the presence of the prisoner is required "unless the application
for the writ and the return present only issues of law. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1952).
475. Crowe v. United States, 175 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 338 U.S.
950 (1950) ; Motion of Davis, 92 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mont. 1949). The Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act would assure the right to counsel. Note, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1289, 1296 (1956).

476. Motion of Davis, 92 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mont. 1945).
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ten days, whereas sixty days is allowed on a motion under section

2255.477 The decisions have not discussed the time and procedure
for appeal from a denial of coram nobis.
A motion to vacate judgment under section 2255 if timely made
may sometimes be treated as tantamount to a motion for a new trial.478
But, if not made within the time limits of rule 33 it cannot be so
treated.479 It would seem that a motion under section 2255 might
well be treated as a petition for coram nobis in cases where the latter
remedy is available and the former is not. A petition for coram nobis
has sometimes been treated as a motion under section 2255; 480 and the
converse ought to be possible.
In practice, though not necessarily in theory, it would seem that
section 2255 has to some extent superseded, or at least overlaps coram
nobis. 481

It may have superseded it as to prisoners still in federal

custody.48 2 However, it has not superseded it as to defendants no
longer in custody; as to such defendants coram nobis seems to be the
only remedy available. May a prisoner challenging a second sentence
which he has not yet begun to serve resort to the motion under section 2255 ? This seems in doubt. One case held that he may not, on
the ground that the statute refers to a prisoner under the sentence which
he attacks. 4s The words "at any time" must be read in connection
477. Mercado v. United States, 183 F.2d 486 (1st Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court
has stated that section 2255 appeals "are governed by the civil rules applicable to appeal from final judgments in habeas corpus actions." United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 203, 209 n.4 (1952).
478. United States v. Drosier, 141 F. Supp. 397, 401 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
479. Bruno v. United States, 180 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
480. United States v. Greco, 141 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1956) ; United States
v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.J. 1954).
481. Note, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 737, 738 (1953), 96 L.Ed. 244, 246 (1952). That the
remedies may be overlapping is indicated in Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949) where the court states: "It is only when
there has been the denial of the substance of a fair trial that the validity of the proceedings may be-thus collaterally attacked or questioned by motion in the nature of
petition for writ of error coram nobis or under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255." In Bruno v. United
States, 180 F.2d 393, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1950) the court stated: "The motion to vacate
permitted by the Code section, although in the nature of coram nobis, is not that writ,
and its nature and meaning must be ascertained from the terms of the statute." In a
case decided after the Morgan case, a petition for coram nobis was treated as a mo:i n to
vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) where the grounds of the petition were the same
as under the statute. United States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.J. 1954) (representation by incompetent counsel was alleged). A recent case, wrongly concluding
that coram nobis is abolished by FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), treated a petition for coram
nobis as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). United States v. Greco, 141 F. Supp.
829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1956).
482. It seems doubtful that a parolee or probationer is in custody so that he can
move under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) ; see United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952) : Owens v. United States, 174 F.2d 469. 470 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 906 (1949) ; Notes, 96 L.Ed. 247 (1952), 63 YALP L.J.
115, 116 n.12 (1953). But see United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 11 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) as to parolees.
483. Crowe v. United States, 186 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1950) ; see Lopez v.
United States, 186 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Greco, 141 F. Supp. 829
(M.D. Pa. 1956) ; United States v. Young, 93 F. Supp. 76 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
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with the related words and clauses which precede it. Under the former
law as to habeas corpus one could attack only a present detention. A
prisoner serving the first of two consecutive sentences is not serving
the second sentence. But, a subsequent decision allowed resort to the
motion.4" 4 The decision pointed out that the statute provided that
the motion could be made at any time. In an early case a prisoner
was permitted to challenge an earlier sentence that he had served on
the ground that its invalidity would reduce the time he must serve
" 5 But,
under his present sentence.48
probably because the motion was
not available in such a case coram nobis was allowed in the Morgan
case.

48 6

The motion procedure under section 2255 seems to have operated
reasonably well. Much of the content of the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

48 7
and approved by the American Bar Association is derived from it.

If amendments to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
are made, the example of section 2255 in fixing no time limits might
well be considered. However, its confinement to persons in custody
should not be followed. Rule 44 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal
Procedure drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1952 i's modeled very closely on section 2255,
as will be indicated in the next part of this article.
XI.
RECENT PROPOSED MODEL REFORMS OF NEW TRIAL.

One of the most notable reforms of motions for a new trial is
that found in Chapter Twenty, Sections 361-368 of the American Law
Institute Code of Criminal Procedure. 8 8 Under section 361 when
the defendant has been convicted the trial court may grant a new trial
on motion of the defendant or on motion of the court provided the
defendant consents. Under section 362 three days is allowed after
484. Halloway v. United States, 191 F.2d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The court
also held that the prisoner could make a motion to correct under FmID. R. CRIM. P. 35
before commencing service of the second sentence. The court left the issue open in
Hinton v. United States, 232 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1956).
485. Griffin v. United States, 175 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949). In United States v.
Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1952) the court referred to the Griffin case without necessarily accepting it.
486. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 702 (1954) ; Note, 53 MICH. L. R~v. 144,
146 (1954).
487. Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1956); Note, 32 N. DAK. L. Rev. 236, 242
(1956) ; Briggs, Coram Nobis, 17 MONT. L. Rv. 160, 184 (1956).
488. ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDUMR

(1930).
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conviction for making the motion."' But, where the ground is newly
discovered evidence one year after conviction is allowed or the motion
may be made "at a later time if the court for good cause so permits."
Thus, the rule is more liberal than the federal rule. Under section 363
the motion is to be in writing and filed; it is to state its ground, and
notice of the motion is to be given to the prosecution. Under section 364 the trial court "shall" grant a new trial if the jurors decided
the verdict by lot, if the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the
evidence, or if there is newly discovered evidence. Under section 365
the trial court "shall" grant a new trial if substantial rights of the
defendant have been prejudiced: where the defendant was not present
at the proceeding; where the jury has received any evidence out of court
(except in the case of a view of the premises) ; where the jurors have
separated without leave of court after retiring to deliberate; where
any juror has been guilty of misconduct; where the prosecutor has
been guilty of misconduct; where the trial court erred in the decision
of any matter of law arising during the trial; and where the court
has misdirected the jury or failed to give a proper instruction requested
by the defendant. Furthermore, the trial court may also grant a new
trial "when from any other cause not due to his own fault the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial." Under section 366
when the motion calls for a decision of any question of fact affidavits
may be used. Under section 367 the court is to make an order granting or refusing a new trial, the order to be entered of record. Under
section 368 when a new trial is granted it shall proceed as if there
had been no former trial. The former conviction shall not be used or
referred to in evidence or argument. There is a serious gap in the
code as it makes no effort to have new trial overlap with habeas corpus
or the writ of error coram nobis. In Chapter 25, on Appeal, section 427
permits the defendant to appeal from a final judgment but says nothing
as to appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial. Under section 428 the prosecution may appeal from "an order granting a new
trial." 491 Under section 463 when judgment is reversed, the appellate
court may discharge the defendant "or, if it thinks proper, grant a
new trial."
489. "An English critic, accustomed to the procedure of the Court of Assize, might
be tempted to regard the three days allowed . . . as unnecessary; it may, at least, cause
a definite waste of judicial time on the last day or two of the session." Brunyate, The
American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930, 49 L.Q. Rlv. 192, 203 (1931).
490. "It may be questioned whether, after judgment and sentence have been passed
and recorded, such a reopening of a decided case ought not properly to be brought befor the appellate court." Brunyate, The American Draft Code of Criminal Procedure,
1930, 49 L.Q. Rvv. 192, 203 (1931).
491. The prosecution may not take such an appeal in federal criminal cases as no
statute provides for it.
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Rule 41 (a) of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and approved by the American Bar Association in 1952 adopts the
492
views of the Advisory Committee rather than of the Supreme Court.
It fixes no time limit for motions for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. It provides as follows:
"New Trial. Upon motion of a defendant, the court may
grant a new trial if required in the interest of justice. If trial
was by the court without a jury, the court may vacate the judgment, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new
judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of
newly discovered evidence may be made at any time, but if an
appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand
of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other ground
shall be made within
days after verdict or finding of guilty or
within such further time as the court may fix during the
day
period."
Rule 44 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure modeled
largely on 28 U.S.C. section 2255 solves the problem of the overlapping of new trial with relief through habeas corpus, writ of error
coram nobis, etc. 4
It provides as follows:
"Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence.

A

prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be re-

leased on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution or statutes of this State or of the United States,
or that the court imposing sentence was without jurisdiction to
492. Hamley, The New Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 16 F.R.D. 283,

287-288 (1955). The committee comment on rule 41 (a) was as follows: "See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 33; cf. ALI CODE, § 361, 362. The federal rule limits motion for a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence to two years after final judgment; the
ALI CODE, to one year after verdict or finding unless permitted by the court for good
cause. New Jersey Rule 2: 7-11 follows the federal rule. However, the Advisory Committee had recommended a rule as proposed above, with no time limit on a motion
based on the ground of newly discovered evidence as well as upon denial of a constitutional right. . . . The time limitation in the rule as adopted has been criticized; see
Dession, New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 197 (1947);
Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 314
(1949); FEDERAL RULES OP CRIMINAL PROaCDuRE: NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDiNGs 206, 230, 240 (1946). Time for filing motions for new trials varies in different
states; see ALI CODE Ol CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1040-1042 (1930)."

493. The Committee Note on rule 44 was as follows: "See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
(1952). The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules recommended that motion for
a new trial could be made at any time on the ground of deprivation of a constitutional
right as well as on that of newly discovered evidence; see FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 35
(2d Preliminary Draft). The elimination of this in the Federal Rules as adopted and
their failure to provide for relief obtainable by writ of error coram nobis or habeas
corpus have been criticized. See Dession, New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:
II, 56 YALE L.J. 197 (1947); Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW, 314 (1949) ; Note, Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950). Federal rule 35 allows for the correction of an
illegal sentence at. any time and to this extent overlaps 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1952)."
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do so, or that the sentence was in excess of that authorized by
law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion
at any time in the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the same. If the motion and the files and records
of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner
is not entitled to relief, the court shall so determine and enter an
order accordingly; otherwise the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served on the prosecuting attorney and grant a prompt
hearing thereon. If the court finds that the judgment was
rendered without jurisdiction or that the sentence imposed was
illegal or otherwise subject to collateral attack, or that there was
such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment subject to collateral attack,
the court shall vacate the judgment and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
sentence as may be appropriate. The court need not entertain
a second motion or successive motions for similar relief on behalf
of the same prisoner."
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